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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY AND
THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. BORDER
Abstract
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government implemented a
number of inbound cargo security programs it described as “pushing the border outward” or
“expanding [the U.S.] perimeter of security.” Are these statements rhetorical flourish, or do
these programs materially affect international cargo trade? This article argues that far from
being mundane or rhetorical, these cargo security programs are transforming how U.S. borders
operate from both a conceptual and practical perspective. Specifically, by moving certain
aspects of border functionality to locations well-removed from the physical U.S. border, these
programs make U.S. regulation of inbound trade significantly more extraterritorial. These
changes affect not only U.S. national security, but also the very patterns and growth of
international trade in goods.
In order to fully explore this thesis, this article first summarizes these programs and
analyzes them through the lens of early- and mid-twentieth century political geography, which is
useful for evaluating the defensive rhetoric and actual structure of these programs. The
jurisdictional and sovereignty aspects of these forward deployment efforts are then examined,
with particular emphasis on efforts to multilateralize these cargo security programs. This article
concludes that the extraterritorial aspects of these programs can be legally justified on a number
of grounds. Multilateral support or consensus is the most readily apparent of these rationales,
but even absent such multilateral support these programs can be defended on other bases,
including that of unilateral, implied consent to these programs by U.S. trading partners and
importers.
The article concludes by addressing the impact of these programs on global trade. In
particular, these cargo security programs can be seen as permanently transforming U.S.
inbound trade regulation from a primarily domestic regime to one for which extraterritoriality is
a central feature. In the short term, this shift has led to greater U.S. control or influence over
foreign commercial and regulatory activities, which is of course significant. In the long term,
however, the effect of these programs will depend upon whether they become truly multilateral in
application or remain largely bilateral or unilateral in effect. If they remain bilateral or
unilateral, the short term status quo of greater U.S. extraterritorial reach will remain in place.
If full multilateralization occurs, however, these programs could reduce or erase many of the
current distinctions between domestic cargo shipments and international cargo shipments, as
foreign regulatory regimes directly affect both international and U.S. domestic cargo shipments.
As discussed in more detail in the article, such multilateral interconnectivity would significantly
alter the nature of international trade in cargo.
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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BORDER: HOMELAND SECURITY AND
THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. BORDER
I.

Introduction
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a huge amount

of legal scholarship on a broad range of national security topics. Yet perhaps surprisingly, the
subject of inbound cargo security remains under-developed in the legal literature. Post-9/11 U.S.
cargo security initiatives have been addressed, but much of the treatment of these programs has
been long on description and short on analysis.1 Generally speaking, to date there has not been
enough broad, thematic discussion of these programs or their important legal and practical
implications. It is therefore the aim of this article to think outside the box—or border—to rectify
this shortcoming.
1

Legal scholarship on the subject of U.S. cargo security includes Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Jessica C. Langston, An
All Hands Evolution: Port Security in the Wake of September 11th, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1333 (2003) (discussing
establishment of the U.S. government’s Container Security Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
program, and 24 Hour Rule, discussed infra in Part III); Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security:
Developments and Implications, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1183 (2003) (reviewing post-9/11 security efforts for ocean-going
cargo); Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime
Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 341, 376-87 (2002) (noting, in discussing the U.S. Container Security Initiative,
that “[t]he favored solution in the United States [to the problem of vessel security and inspection] is the concept of
pushing U.S. borders outward,” and briefly discussing sovereignty concerns raised by the initiative); Matthew T.
McGrath & Cortney O’Toole Morgan, International Legal Developments in Review: 2002, Business Regulation,
Customs Law, 37 INT’L LAW. 245 (2003) (generally summarizing U.S. customs law developments, including efforts
to “push the border outward”); Douglas M. Browning, The Smart Border: Movement of Goods—Transportation
and Customs Aspects, 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 151 (2003) (briefly discussing U.S. government “effort[s] to balance trade
and security interests and . . . ways to extend the border”); Leslie Alan Glick, Terrorism: The Legal Implications of
the Response to September 11, 2001, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627 (2002) (summarizing U.S. Customs and Coast
Guard responses to the 9/11 attacks); Sung Y. Lee, The Container Security Initiative: Balancing U.S. Security
Interests with the European Union’s Legal and Economic Concerns, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123 (2004)
(discussing the Container Security Initiative); and Jessica Romero, Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The
Container Security Initiative, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 597 (2003) (summarizing development of the U.S. Container Security
Initiative and briefly discussing sovereignty concerns raised by this program).
Other scholarship on this topic from outside the legal academy provides useful discussion but also falls
somewhat short thematically. See, e.g., AARON LUKAS, PROTECTION WITHOUT PROTECTIONISM: RECONCILING
TRADE AND HOMELAND SECURITY (CATO Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies 2004) (discussing the tension
between trade and homeland security in economic terms and briefly touching on sovereignty issues), available at
http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-027.pdf; Irvin Lin Fang Jau, Not Yet All Aboard . . . But Already All at Sea
Over the Container Security Initiative, J. HOMELAND SEC’Y (Nov. 2002) (properly identifying sovereignty-related
concerns raised by post-9/11 U.S. border security initiatives and concluding that cooperative efforts are required for
success), available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Jau.html.
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What is particularly striking about current U.S. inbound cargo security programs is that
the U.S. government describes them as efforts to improve national security by “pushing the
border outward.”2

Robert C. Bonner, the former commissioner of Customs and Border

Protection (“CBP”), the federal agency charged with primary implementation and oversight of
these programs, has characterized them as efforts “to expand our [U.S.] perimeter of security
away from our national boundaries and towards foreign points of departure.”3 In fact, the phrase
“pushing the border outward” has become something of a U.S. national security battle cry in
recent years, and its rise to prominence has paralleled the entry of the term “homeland security”
into our national discourse.4 The phrase “pushing the border outward” (or some close variant)
has appeared in multiple CBP statements and publications,5 and it also has appeared in

2

See, e.g., Hearing on Security at U.S. Seaports, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
(Feb. 19, 2002) (Statement of U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb192002.xml.
Customs and Border Protection is the successor agency to the U.S. Customs Service. See U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/cbp.xml.
3

Hearing on Security at U.S. Seaports, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Feb. 19,
2002) (Statement of U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb192002.xml.

4

A recent search on the legal database Lexis uncovered only one U.S. law review article that used the term
“homeland security” without referencing the September 11, 2001, attacks or terrorism, and even it was a fall 2001
publication. See Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89, 102 (2001) (generally discussing funding issues for national security or homeland
security versus other government programs such as insurance) (search on Lexis, Dec. 30, 2005, US Law Reviews
and Journals, Combined, “homeland w/3 security and ‘national security’”).
5

See Hearing on U.S. Customs FY 2003 Budget Request, House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on
Treasury, Postal Services, and General Government (Feb. 27, 2002) (noting that Customs is “fostering initiatives
that ‘push the border outwards’ and extend our national security perimeter”) (Statement of U.S. Customs
Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb272002.xml;
Hearing on Security at U.S. Seaports, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Feb. 19,
2002) (“In approaching our primary mission to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from transiting our borders, I
believe that Customs must also do everything possible to ‘push the border outwards.’”) (Statement of U.S. Customs
Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb192002.xml; U.S.
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congressional testimony by U.S. Coast Guard personnel and in Congressional Research Service
reports on national security law matters.6 President George W. Bush drew upon the related
theme of forward deployment during the 2004 presidential election.7 The Bush Administration’s
first National Security Strategy, issued in September 2002, did not employ this precise phrase,
but it did speak of “identifying and destroying [terrorist] threat[s] before [they] reach[ ] our
borders,” which in many respects is much the same thing.8 The 9/11 Commission Report backs

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, PERFORMANCE AND ANNUAL REPORT 2004 13 (listing an ongoing
Customs and Border Protection goal of “continued implementation of proven programs” such as the Container
Security initiative that have been characterized as efforts to forward deploy the U.S. border), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/admin/ cbp_annual.ctt/cbp_annual.pdf; U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, PERFORMANCE AND ANNUAL REPORT 2003 2 (“Pushing our zone of security
outward through joint initiatives with foreign governments such as the Container Security Initiative”) (on file with
the author). See also Leslie Woolf, Global Terrorism Three Years Later, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
TODAY (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/Sep/global.xml; McGrath & Morgan,
supra note 1, at 247.
6

See Coast Guard and NOAA FY Budget Requests, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries and
Coast Guard, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2003)
(“Homeland Security necessitates pushing America’s maritime borders outward, away from ports and waterways so
layered, maritime security operations can be implemented”) (Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=659&wit_id=1756; Pushing the Border Out on Alien
Smuggling: New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 108th Cong. (May 18, 2004)
(“This hearing . . . will also examine new initiatives and proposals that might help ‘push the border out’ in
combating alien smuggling on all levels. . . .”) (statement of Rep. Lee), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/ hju93716.000/hju93716_0.HTM; Lisa M. Seghetti et al., CRS
Report for Congress—Border and Transportation Security: Possible New Directions and Policy Options, RL
32840, 5-11 (Mar. 29, 2005) (discussing U.S. government programs and policies to “push[ ] the border outwards to
intercept unwanted people or goods before they reach the United States”), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32840.pdf; William H. Robinson et al., CRS Report for Congress—Border
and Transportation Security: Possible New Directions and Policy Options, RL 32841, 5 (Mar. 29, 2005); available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32841.pdf; Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Actions Taken Since 9/11, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ newsroom/
fact_sheets/09172004.xml.
7

See George W. Bush, President's Remarks on Homeland Security in New Jersey, Evesham Recreation Center,
Burlington County, New Jersey (Oct. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041018-11.html (“Our first duty in the war on terror is to
protect the homeland. . . . In a free and open society, it is impossible to protect against every threat. So, . . . we must
pursue a comprehensive strategy against terror. The best way to prevent attacks is to stay on the offense against the
enemy overseas.”)
8

THE NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. This language in the 2002 National Security Strategy in fact appeared in
the context of asserting the right of self defense via pre-emptive military strike, but it is not unreasonable to read the
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this conceptual approach by recommending that foreign visitor screening be done abroad, and
noting that “[t]he further away from our borders that screening occurs, the more security benefits
we gain.”9

The prevalence of the phrase “pushing the border outward” thus presents an interesting
question: is it simply an exercise in appealing rhetoric and imagery, or is there real substance
lurking behind the words? To restate the question differently, are these programs relatively
uneventful administrative measures, or do they represent important, material alterations to
international cargo trade? This article argues that far from being mundane or rhetorical, the U.S.
cargo security programs described as “pushing the border outward” are in fact transforming how
U.S. borders operate from both a conceptual and practical perspective. Specifically, by moving
certain aspects of border functionality to locations well-removed from the physical U.S. border,
these programs are making U.S. regulation of inbound trade significantly more extraterritorial in
its reach, and thus more akin to U.S. export control laws, which for decades now have been

greater (pre-emptive military strike) to include the lesser (employing non-military measures to counter terrorist
threats). In any event, the language of the 2002 National Security Strategy was intentionally non-specific.
The administration’s revised National Security Strategy of March 2006 is even more non-specific, and
speaks broadly (and rather definitionally) of protecting America by preventing terrorist attacks “before they occur . .
. using a broad range of tools.” THE NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (Mar.
2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. Even more so than the 2002 version, the
2006 language clearly would include non-military measures to prevent terrorist attacks, such as those discussed in
this article.
9

See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 389 (2004), available
at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
Even the outcry in early 2006 concerning the proposed acquisition of managerial control of major U.S.
seaports by a United Arab Emirates company, Dubai Ports World, underscores from a different angle the
significance that border and port security matters occupy in United States governmental policy. In that case, the
concern centered on the proposed operation of major U.S. ports by a Middle Eastern firm, which many observers
viewed as an incursive breach of the U.S. international trade security perimeter. See Goodbye, Dubai, L.A. Times
B12 (Mar. 10, 2006); US Economic Barriers; Bush Must Set Out a Stronger Case Against Protectionism, FIN.
TIMES, Leader 14 (Mar. 13, 2006); Jonathan Weisman, Arab Firm Offers to Delay Deal on Seaports, WASH. POST
A01 (Feb. 24, 2006).
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characterized by substantial extraterritoriality. These changes to U.S. border functionality will
not only affect U.S. national security, but perhaps even more importantly, they promise to work
enormous changes on the pattern and growth of international trade.

In order to fully develop and explore this thesis, this article is structured as follows. First,
Part II of the article summarizes relevant aspects of the pre-and post-September 11, 2001,
international trade landscape. This section illustrates that the perceived tension between the
promotion of international trade and the furtherance of U.S. national security is a key driver of
current U.S. cargo security programs to “push the border outward.” Part III then provides a
concise technical overview of the primary post-September 11, 2001, U.S. government programs
that “push the border outward” in terms of ocean-going, overland, and air transit cargo, and also
discusses how these activities fit into the overall framework of current U.S. national security
efforts. Next, Part IV analyzes these programs through the lens of early- and mid-twentieth
century political geography, which is helpful for evaluating the defensive rhetoric and actual
structure of these U.S. government programs. Part V addresses jurisdictional and sovereignty
aspects of these forward deployment efforts, with particular emphasis on the current trend toward
multilateralizing and internationally harmonizing these cargo security programs.

Finally, Part VI offers observations concerning the short- and long-term effects of these
forward deployment programs. In particular, cargo security programs designed to “push the
border outward” can be seen as transforming the U.S. inbound trade sector from one of largely
domestic application to one for which extraterritoriality is a core feature. In the short term, this
has resulted in greater U.S. control or influence over foreign commercial and regulatory
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activities, which is a significant development.

In the long term, the effect of such

extraterritoriality will depend upon whether these U.S. programs become truly multilateral in
application or remain largely bilateral or unilateral in effect.

If they remain bilateral or

unilateral, the short term status quo of greater U.S. extraterritorial reach will remain in place. If
multilateralization occurs, however, these cargo security programs could help reduce or erase
many of the current distinctions between domestic cargo shipments and international cargo
shipments—which, as explained below, could transform the nature of international trade in
cargo.

II.

The International Trade Landscape Prior to and Following September 11, 2001
In order to fully appreciate the perceived U.S. need to “push the border outward”

following September 11, 2001, it is worth first reviewing certain international trade
developments over recent decades. As explained below, the reduction in customs tariffs since
the 1960s and the advent of containerized cargo and “just-in-time” inventory practices have
fueled an explosive increase in U.S. international trade. However, these developments also have
created or exacerbated security weaknesses in the structure of international trade in goods, and
this in turn has led to current U.S. government efforts to “push the border outward.”

A.

Efforts to Facilitate International Trade Prior to September 11, 2001
It is well established that international trade is a powerful engine for economic growth,

largely due to the effects of comparative advantage and specialization.

However, the

transactions costs involved in international trade—costs such as multimodal transport through
multiple jurisdictions, regulatory fees and customs duties, various inspections, and the need for
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transactions to comply with the rules of at least two legal regimes—are generally recognized as
more numerous and more significant than those in domestic transactions, and these of course
have a dampening effect on trade. In response, certain aspects of the modern global marketplace
are the result of efforts, both regulatory and purely commercial, to reduce transactions costs and
promote international trade.

Since the 1940s the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(now the World Trade Organization, or WTO) have worked to reduce customs duty levels and
other barriers to international trade, thus making international trade more economically viable.10
WTO trade statistics show that in goods alone, world trade levels have increased approximately
70-fold since 1960, not accounting for inflation.11 In the United States, international trade levels
have increased exponentially over the past several decades.12

Another effort to reduce transactions costs in international trade has been the widespread

10

See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 267-70 (2d. ed. 2001).

11

Specifically, excluding the effects of inflation, worldwide import levels have increased from US$137,000 million
in 1960 to US$9,495,000 million in 2004, and worldwide export levels have grown from US$130,000 million in
1960 to US$9,153,000 million in 2004. See World Trade Organization, Statistics Database, available at
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language (data available on the WTO “Time Series” searchable
database).

12

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of goods rose from
approximately US$15,000 million in 1960 to US$1,473,000 million in 2004, an increase of nearly 10,000% (not
accounting for inflation). U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Trade in Goods and Services—
Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf.
In like fashion, U.S. exports of goods increased from approximately US$20,000 million in 1960 to US$808,000
million in 2004, a rise of over 4,000% (again not accounting for inflation). Id. It is worth noting that outbound and
inbound foreign investment levels also have experienced exponential growth in recent decades. See Gregory W.
Bowman, E-Mails, Servers, and Software: U.S. Export Controls for the Modern Era, 35 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L.
319, 320-22 nn. 7 & 9 (2004).
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use of containerized ocean cargo, which began in the 1950s.13

Prior to containerization,

international cargo shipments were characterized by “break-bulk” cargo handling:

goods

destined for foreign markets were packed piecemeal onto trucks or railway cars for domestic
transport to a seaport, where these goods would be unpacked, laden onto ocean-going vessels,
and repacked.14

The same process would occur in reverse at the foreign port.

With

containerized shipping, by contrast, goods could be loaded onto a container at a centralized
warehouse and be transported to the seaport, where the sealed container could be laden onto a
sea-going vessel without unpacking and repacking. Containerized shipments thus required less
handling, which significantly reduced shipping costs, loading time, and cargo breakage.15 It has
been estimated that approximately 90 percent of current global trade in goods uses shipping
containers.16

More recently, “just-in-time” inventory practices have further reduced the cost of doing
business, both domestically and internationally, by often reducing the need to maintain large
stocks of inventory. This freeing up of capital and resources previously devoted to inventory has
contributed significantly to international economic growth over the past decade.17 Thus, the
triumvirate of reduced customs duties and other trade barriers, containerized shipping, and just-

13

See Mellor, supra note 1, at 347-48.

14

See Mellor, supra note 1, at 347.

15

See Mellor, supra note 1, at 348.

16

Press Release, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative Forging Ahead (Aug. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/pas/pr/2002/081201.htm; Stephen E. Flynn, The New Reality in
Canada/U.S. Relations: Reconciling Security and Economic Interests and the “Smart Border Declaration,” 29
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 9, 14 (2003).
17

Mellor, supra note 1, at 352.
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in-time inventory practices has fueled a global economic revolution in recent decades, and
international trade levels (as well as foreign direct investment levels) have skyrocketed.

B.

U.S. International Trade Security Prior to September 11, 2001
This increase in international trade presented problems, of course. Between the rise in

international trade volumes, the difficulty of inspecting containerized shipments, and the
emergence in recent decades of a limited number of international trade “mega-ports”—ports such
as Singapore and Bremerhaven, Germany that serve as transshipment hubs for large portions of
ocean-going trade18—international ocean shipments arriving in the United States were replete
with containers from unverified vendors holding goods that might or might not match their
shipping documentation.19 Shipments by sea and land regularly arrived in the United States with
little advance information regarding their contents or source.20

Nonetheless, the security of inbound international trade shipments remained a relatively
low-profile issue prior to September 11, 2001, at least in comparison to concerns over drug
interdiction and the facilitation of international trade flows.21 Trade security concerns did not
18

See Press Release, U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative Forging Ahead, Aug. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/pas/pr/2002/081201.htm. The U.S. Customs Service (now CBP) has used the term
“mega-port” loosely to refer to high-volume ports. Others have suggested more formal definitions based on factors
such as a port’s infrastructure and ability to serve high-volume, deep draft cargo vessels. See, e.g., John G. Fox, Sea
Change in Shipping, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, at 62, 65 (cited in Mellor, supra note 1, at 348),
and Tex. S. Interim Comm. on Natural Res. Rep., 77th Leg., at 35-36 (2000) (cited in Mellor, supra note 1, at 348).

19

Mellor, supra note 1, at 348-349; Stephen E. Flynn, The Fragile State of Container Security (2003), available at
http://www.cfr.org/pub5730/stephen_e_flynn/the_fragile_state_of_container_security.php (testimony before U.S.
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee);
20

Mellor, supra note 1, at 341-344; John F. Fritelli, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for
Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. 12 (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf.

21

See Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 46 U.S.C. § 70101 et seq., § 101(14) (PL 107-295)
(congressional finding that a 1999 study of port crimes emphasized drug smuggling as one of the most prevalent

Thinking Outside the Border
Page 10
gain significant political traction, largely because historically there had been relatively few highprofile security problems with them.22 Thus, as trade volumes continued to rise, the percentage
of U.S. import shipments inspected prior to entry into the United States continued to fall, until by
2001 fewer than two percent of sea-going cargo containers arriving at U.S. ports were being
inspected.23

In other words, prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. government’s modus operandi
(although certainly not its official policy) was that national security was not significantly
impaired by an import system that (a) obtained little reliable advance information regarding
port crimes); Stephen E. Flynn, The Fragile State of Container Security, supra note 19 (testimony before U.S.
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee); see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, Did the War on Drugs Die with the
Birth of the War on Terrorism?: A Closer Look at Civil Forfeiture and Racial Profiling After 9/11, 14 FED. SENT. R.
147 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002) (discussing preemption of the “war on drugs” by the post-9/11 “war on terrorism”);
Robert C. Bonner, Statement, Speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Washington,
DC, Jan. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/jan172002.xml (noting
significant public concern following 9/11 over the fact that “Customs manages to inspect only about 2% of the total
volume of trade entering the country each year”); Ronn Ronck, Customs Trade Symposium Highlights Agency
Priorities, U.S. Customs Today (Jan. 2001), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2001/January/custoday_tradesymp.xml (discussing Customs’ pre-9/11 focus
on facilitating trade flows via automation).
In fact, a review of U.S. Customs (now CBP) publications and press releases prior to September 11, 2001,
reveals a clear lack of focus on trade security matters. See, e.g., Rob Scholtens, Customs Cooperation Results in a
Major Hashish Seizure, U.S. Customs Today (May 2000), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/custoday/may2000/anticoun.htm; It’s Your Skin—Teaming Up Against Counterfeiters, U.S.
Customs Today (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2001/August/custoday_skin.xml
(discussing safety hazards posed by counterfeit goods); Customs and UL Fight Counterfeiting Threats to Public
Safety, U.S. Customs Today (Jan. 2001), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2001/August/custoday_safety.xml (same).
22

Even WTO multilateral efforts to establish a framework for facilitating and regulating optional preshipment
inspection of international cargo shipments focused not on security concerns, but rather on regulating the use of
private inspection companies by developing countries, which was increasingly seen by developed countries as
impeding international trade with those countries without improving the accuracy of shipment documentation. See
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#wtoagreement;
Kenneth P. Kansa, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? The Case Against Continued Reliance on Preshipment
Inspection Services as Customs Alternatives, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1151 (1999); How to Reduce the Cost and Delays of
Preshipment Inspections, Managing Exports (Feb. 2001), available in Lexis, News & Business, Marketing &
Industry file.
23

Mellor, supra note 1, at 341-343; Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1345-1346.
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inbound shipments, (b) conducted few inbound shipment inspections, and (c) eschewed security
efforts in favor of trade facilitation. For sea-going cargo, for example, vessels arriving at U.S.
ports did not have to file vessel manifests describing their contents until 48 hours prior to
arriving at a U.S. port.24 The combination of vessel manifest filing rules and the difficulty of
confirming the contents of shipping containers meant that vessels bound for U.S. ports contained
unknown and unverified contents—and once shipments arrived they were subjected to infrequent
physical inspections, in the interest of facilitating trade flows.25 Overland imports into the
United States by truck and train and imports by air did not suffer as much from the problem of
lack of knowledge due to containerization; rather, their problem was that transit distances and
transit times to the U.S. border were relatively short in comparison to ocean cargo. Just-in-time
delivery pressures could result in little time between a shipment’s departure from its foreign
point of origin and its arrival at the U.S. border point of entry, which could generate significant
pressure to minimize border delays.26 In the battle between trade facilitation and inbound trade
security, facilitation clearly had the upper hand.

C.

U.S. International Trade Security Following September 11, 2001
U.S. inbound trade security measures clearly were due for major rethinking following the

24

Clyne, supra note 1, at 1200-1201. See also Preliminary Entry, 19 C.F.R. § 4.8 (2001); Boarding of Vessels in the
United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 2868 (Jan. 19, 2000); Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs Before
Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port for Transport to the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 66318 (Oct. 31,
2002) (implementing changes to section 4.8 of the Customs Regulations).
25

26

Mellor, supra note 1, at 341-343; Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1345-1346.

See Allan J. Cocksedge, The Smart Border: Movement of Goods—Transportation and Customs Aspects, 29 CAN.U.S. L.J. 141, 143-144 (2003); TRANSPORT CANADA, FINAL REPORT: THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF U.S. IMPORT
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AT THE CANADA/U.S. LAND BORDER ON THE CANADIAN TRUCKING INDUSTRY (May 24,
2005), available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/report/BorderStudy/Main.htm (discussing potentially significant
delays of U.S. advance reporting and document submission requirements for imports from Canada to the United
States) [hereinafter TRANSPORT CANADA BORDER REPORT].
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September 11, 2001 attacks. A primary theme in U.S. government post-9/11 discourse on
national security matters has been the need for the United States to take a stronger defensive
posture on a number of fronts, and this emphasis has played out in a variety of ways. Thus, in
the words of CBP Commissioner Bonner, after September 11, 2001, border security became a
“top priority.”27

Much of the recent debate over inbound trade security has focused on how to improve
U.S. national security without causing disastrous reductions or delays in inbound trade flows.28
On the commercial side of the equation, greater U.S. international trade has resulted in greater
U.S. economic interdependence, so that interruptions or reductions in international trade can
have enormously adverse effects on the U.S. economy.29 Just-in-time inventory practices have
exacerbated the effects of import delays by slowing or shutting down production lines.30 On the
security side of the equation, containerization and high trade volumes have made it difficult to

27

Hearing on Security at U.S. Seaports, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Feb. 19,
2002) (Statement of U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb192002.xml. See also
Lee, supra note 1, at 134-141.

28

See, e.g., MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 3-4
(2005) (discussing importance of avoiding port delays or shutdowns in the quest for improving maritime security),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_MCSPlan.pdf. For a discussion of similar concerns
with respect to U.S. exports, see Bowman, supra note 12 at 319.
29

For example, in 2002 U.S. west coast ports were shut down after port employers locked out employees for 10 days
during a labor contract dispute. The closure delayed billions of dollars of imports, and to reopen the ports and avoid
further gridlock the Bush Administration was forced to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. See Bill Mongelluzzo,
West Coast Port Deal Will Bring Pay Hikes, New Technology, J. COMM., Ocean Section (Nov. 24, 2002).

30

Julian Keeling, JIT After 9/11, J. COMM. 86 (Oct. 1, 2001) (noting plant shutdowns caused by shipping delays
following September 11, 2001). See also Robert C. Bonner, Securing America’s Borders While Safeguarding
Commerce, Heritage Lecture #796, Sept. 12, 2003 (noting that when the U.S.-Canada border was “virtually shut
down” after September 11, 2001, some U.S. automotive plants were forced to halt production within three days),
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL796.cfm.
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verify the validity and safety of inbound shipments, as discussed above.31 Consequently, any
given shipping container imported into the United States could contain explosive devices,
adulterated food products, chemical agents, or other materials for use in terrorist attacks, which
might have been loaded into the container at its point of origin or added during transit. Add to
this the fact that ocean-going and overland shipments generally could depart their foreign
locations without manifest information being filed with the U.S. government, and the result was
a series of import regulatory schemes deemed no longer acceptable.

The U.S. government response to this trade facilitation-versus-national security
conundrum has multiple facets, including its programs to “push the border outward” for inbound
shipments.32 Despite the slogan-like quality of the phrase “push the border outward,” these U.S.

31

32

See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.

Other facets include, for example, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a single federal
agency overseeing homeland security matters and the incorporation into DHS of portions of the former U.S.
Customs Service (now CBP), Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Coast Guard; development of The
National Strategy for Maritime Security to coordinate efforts to protect the maritime domain; more stringent
registration requirements for incoming vessels, trains, trucks, and airplanes and their personnel; and heightened
efforts to employ newer technologies such as biometrics for personnel screening purposes. See Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY
(2005); George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (June 2002), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/book.pdf; Department of Homeland Security, History: Who Became Part
of the Department?, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0133.xml.
It is worth commenting briefly on the United States’ National Strategy for Maritime Security, since it refers
to and relies in part on some of the programs discussed in this article, such as CSI and C-TPAT. See discussion in
Part III infra. In late 2004, President Bush ordered the development of a comprehensive maritime security program
for the United States. See National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive HSPD-13 (Dec. 21, 2004). The following year, The National Strategy for Cargo Security was issued,
along with eight subject-specific plans for implementing this strategy. See, e.g., MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY
PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY (2005); NATIONAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE MARITIME
DOMAIN AWARENESS FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 6, 13 (2005); MARITIME COMMERCE
SECURITY PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 11 (2005); THE MARITIME
INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 11 (2005);
INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME
SECURITY App. B (2005). The strategy and accompanying plans are available on the Department of Homeland
Security’s website at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0597.xml. Like the 2002 and 2006
National Security Strategies issued by the Bush administration, these documents provide an assessment of national
security risks and a discussion of strategies and goals, only focused of course on the maritime environment. Due to
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government cargo security programs in fact do hold the possibility of furthering the twin goals of
trade facilitation and improved national security through the forward deployment of certain
aspects or functions of the U.S. border. The following section provides a concise technical
overview of the primary U.S. government initiatives aimed at pushing border functions outward
for inbound cargo. These programs and their legal and commercial ramifications are then
analyzed further in Parts IV through VI.

III.

Thinking Outside the Border: Pushing the Border Outward
The core inbound U.S. national security programs described as efforts to “push the border

outward” are administered by CBP at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The CBP
programs discussed below are part of has been described as a “multi-layer strategy” to intercept
inbound terrorist shipments of items such as conventional weapons or weapons of mass
destruction and to provide “point of origin cargo security.”33

Due to the regulatory and

sometimes technical nature of these programs, a concise summary of each program’s intended
effect is provided. While these programs are technically separate initiatives, they are expressly
intended to interact with and be complementary of one another, and CBP has collectively
referred to the programs as the “U.S. Cargo Security Strategy.”34

It should be noted that there currently are efforts on Capitol Hill to codify some of these

the fact that they address a broad range of non-border-related maritime matters and do not address non-maritime
border-related concerns, however, they are not the focus of this article.
33

34

Fritelli, supra note 20, at 18.

CBP Holds the 5th Annual Trade Symposium 2004, available at www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/
2005/JanFeb/symposium.xml.
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programs, which to date have been carried out under existing regulatory authority granted to
CBP.

Enactment of this legislation—the Safe Ports Act of 2006 passed by the House of

Representatives in May 2006 and the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act of 2006 under
consideration in the Senate—would have little, if any, effect on the overall structure or operation
of these programs, but such codification would further demonstrate the United States’
commitment to improving national security through measures that forward deploy certain border
functions.35

A.

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) for Ocean Cargo
In order to address import cargo security concerns, in January 2002 the U.S. Customs

Service (now CBP) launched the Container Security Initiative, or CSI.36 The primary goal of
CSI is “to protect the global trading system and the trade lanes between CSI ports and the U.S.”37

CSI rests on four foundational elements: first, the use of intelligence and data concerning
shipments “to identify and target containers that post a risk for terrorism”; second, the “prescreening” of suspect containers, typically prior to departure from foreign ports; third, the use of
technology (such as X-ray or radiation detection devices) to pre-screen containers, so as to

35

See Safe Ports Act of 2006, H.R. 4964, 109th Cong. (2006); GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act of 2006, S.
2458, 109th Cong. (2006).

36

See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CSI Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_f
act_sheet.doc [hereinafter CSI Fact Sheet].
37

Id. CSI was modeled on an earlier U.S.-Canada pilot program called the Joint Targeting Initiative, which was
established on a limited basis in 1999 between the United States and Canada to improve inter-governmental
cooperation and prevent unlawful activities such as smuggling. See Browning, supra note 1, at 151; Rob Scholtens,
Customs Cooperation Results in a Major Hashish Seizure, U.S. Customs Today (May 2000), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/custoday/may2000/anticoun.htm.
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minimize delays caused by screening; and fourth, the use of tamper-resistant containers to ensure
illicit items are not added to shipping containers during transit unbeknownst to the shipper or
U.S. importer.38 In describing CSI’s purpose and effect, government officials have expressly
described CSI as a means of “extend[ing] the border for Customs purposes beyond the traditional
port of entry” and thus helping protect against terrorist attacks.39

In order to effectuate CSI, the U.S. government has entered into bilateral agreements with
foreign countries that directly trade with the United States or are major transshipment points for
goods being shipped to the United States.40 Each bilateral agreement is reciprocal in form.
Pursuant to these agreements, the U.S. government is permitted to station CBP personnel at these
foreign ports, and the foreign government has the right to station its customs officials at U.S.
ports. CBP personnel stationed abroad under CSI target shipping containers that are considered
suspect and in need of further inspection.41 CBP personnel then request that foreign government

38

See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36.

39

Browning, supra note 1, at 151; see also Robert C. Bonner, Securing America’s Border While Safeguarding
Commerce, Heritage Foundation Lecture Series (Aug. 20, 2003) available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL796.cfm; Hearing on U.S. Customs FY 2003 Budget
Requests, House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Services, and General Government
(Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/feb272002.x
ml; CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
The scope and intent of CSI was presaged in congressional testimony by Stephen E. Flynn, a Senior Fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations, who asserted that U.S. government agencies needed to stop thinking of their
missions as primarily domestic, with jurisdiction that “runs out at the water’s edge”; that the focus should be on
mega-ports first; and that U.S. inspectors and investigators should “push[ed] beyond the border itself into common
bilateral or multilateral inspection zones.” Hearing on “Weak Links: Assessing the Vulnerability of U.S. Ports and
Whether the Government is Adequately Structured to Safeguard Them,” Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
(Dec. 6, 2001) (statement of Stephen E. Flynn).
40

41

CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36; Lee, supra note 1, at 123; Mellor, supra note 1, at 341.

CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: KEY CARGO
SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED (2005) (GAO-05-466T), available at
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/homelandsecurity.html (statement of Richard M. Stana) [hereinafter GAO
2003 KEY CARGO SECURITY REPORT]; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE:
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personnel undertake to conduct inspections and enforcement actions as necessary. In other
words, CBP personnel have access to shipment information and act in an advisory capacity to
identify shipments of concern, but the foreign host governments have the final say regarding
whether, when, and how to inspect potentially problematic containers.42 For countries that
station CSI customs personnel in the United States, a mirror image of these processes is
supposed to take place for shipments from the United States to those countries.43

Despite its bilateral form, to date the implementation of CSI has been heavily skewed in
favor of U.S. interests. In fact, so far only Canada and Japan have stationed customs personnel
in the United States under the CSI program.44 In light of this, one foreign commentator has
strongly suggested that CSI’s reciprocality is far more form than substance.45 Moreover, in light
of the stakes involved, it can be expected that the United States will strongly encourage foreign
CSI partner countries to comply with U.S. requests for stoppage and inspection of shipments
bound for the United States. With few foreign customs personnel in the United States, however,
there will be little pressure exerted in the opposite direction, and in fact it is an open question
whether the United States would be as cooperative regarding requests for stoppage and

EXPANSION OF KEY CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 2, 9
(2003) (GAO-03-770), available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/homelandsecurity.html [hereinafter
GAO 2003 CSI REPORT].
42

CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36; GAO 2003 CSI REPORT, supra note 41, at 2, 9.

43

CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36; GAO 2003 CSI REPORT, supra note 41, at 2, 9; Lee, supra note 1, at 123.

44

CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36.

45

Jau, supra note 1. Jau notes that while U.S.-Canada trade is “reciprocal in nature and volume,” U.S. trade with
the rest of the world is “weighted unilaterally toward the United States”—as the persistent U.S. trade deficit
demonstrates. Id. The fact that CSI is modeled on the Joint Targeting Initiative, a U.S.-Canada program, could be
viewed as an improper application of a bilateral model in a unilateral context. See supra note 37. Legal and
operational concerns raised by CSI are discussed in Part V infra.
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inspection of outgoing shipments.46 This subject is discussed further in Part V below.

At the outset, the U.S. government focused on establishing CSI agreements with nations
that had “mega-ports” with high volumes of containerized shipments to the United States.47 CSI
agreements for these twenty mega-ports have been obtained, and U.S. efforts have turned to
reaching CSI agreements covering other ports that ship to the United States.48 As of June 2006,
the United States had formal CSI agreements in place with more than 20 countries covering more
than 40 foreign ports.49 A significant further development in the expansion and development of

46

In addition to the questionable reciprocality of CSI, there have been other problems with the implementation of
the CSI program. One expert observer has criticized the small number of U.S. CBP personnel placed abroad and has
asserted that such inadequate staffing undermines the effectiveness of the program. Stephen E. Flynn, The Ongoing
Neglect of Maritime Transportation Security, (Aug. 24, 1004), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7314/ongoing_neglect_of_maritime_transportation_security.html (written testimony
before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure). In similar fashion, in some instances CBP personnel stationed abroad under CSI reportedly have
identified containers of concern to be inspected, only to find that the containers already had been shipped and were
en route to the United States. In other cases, containers were identified in time, but foreign government personnel
declined to conduct the requested inspections. Eric Lipton, Loopholes Seen in U.S. Efforts to Secure Ports, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2005. The approach used by CBP to identify potentially problematic shipments also has come
under fire. Toby Eckert, Senators Say Cargo Security Still Lagging, COPLEY NEWS SERV. (Aug. 5, 2005). Still, CSI
is in place in many foreign ports and has resulted in the forward deployment of cargo inspection functions from the
U.S. port of entry to the foreign port of departure.
47

Romero, supra note 1, at 600 (2003); Jau, supra note 1, at 3. The 20 ports initially identified by CBP as megaports were responsible for approximately two-thirds (by value) of containerized shipments to the United States.
Romero, supra note 1, at 600. These 20 ports were Hong Kong; Shanghai, China; Singapore; Kaohsiung, Taiwan;
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Pusan, Republic of Korea; Bremerhaven, Germany; Tokyo, Japan; Genoa, Italy;
Yantian, China; Antwerp, Belgium; Nagoya, Japan, Le Havre, France; Hamburg, Germany; La Spezia, Italy;
Felixstowe, United Kingdom; Algeciras, Spain; Kobe, Japan; Yokohama, Japan; and Laem Chabang, Thailand. See
Press Release, U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative Forging Ahead (Aug. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ pas/pr/2002/081201.htm.
48

49

See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36.

Id.; Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative Coming to Jamaica (June
20, 2006), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/06202006_2.xml; Press Release, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strengthening Port Security: Salalah, Oman
Becomes 43rd Container Security Initiative Port (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/032006/03072006_3.xml.
It is important to note that CSI is not the only CBP program for identifying potentially problematic
containerized shipments. Other programs include the Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative (“SCTI”) and the Compliance
Measurement Examination (“CME”) program. See McGrath & Morgan, supra note 1, at 245; Press Release, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Implements Enhanced Anti-Terror Sea Cargo Targeting at All U.S.
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CSI is that the United States has successfully obtained WCO, G-8 and European Union support
for the CSI program.50 As discussed further in Parts V and VI below, this adds to the legitimacy
of this program from a sovereignty and jurisdictional perspective, and also may help amplify
CSI’s long-term effect on structural aspects of global trade.

B.

24 Hour Advance Notification Rule for Ocean Cargo
Part of the logistical challenge in identifying potentially problematic shipments bound for

the United States is obtaining complete and timely information about these shipments. Before
September 11, 2001, an ocean-going vessel was not obligated to submit a manifest to the U.S.
government declaring its cargo until 48 hours prior to arriving at its first U.S. port of call.51 In
the shipping industry it therefore was common practice for vessel manifests to be prepared after

Seaports (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/legacy/2002/92002/09032002.xml. Both of these
programs, however, focus on identifying potentially problematic shipments and inspecting them at the U.S. port of
destination, rather than abroad. SCTI is only used for shipments from non-CSI participating foreign ports, and thus
can be viewed as a second-best or stop-gap measure in the absence of CSI. CME applies to all shipments, and can
be viewed as part of a layered approach to import security: CSI abroad for containerized shipments, and CME at the
U.S. port of destination. However, CSI is the inspection program that involves the forward deployment of certain
border functions. McGrath & Morgan, supra.
50

See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 36; European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General,
Customs and Security, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/index_en.htm; Agreement
Between the European Community and the United States of America on Intensifying and Broadening the Agreement
on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters to Include Cooperation on Container Security
and Related Matters, O.J. L.304/34 (Apr. 24, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_304/l_30420040930en00340037.pdf; 2003 G-8 Summit, Enhance Transport
Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS): A G8 Action Plan, available at
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/enhance_transport_security_and_c
ontrol_of_man-portable_air_defence_systems_-_manpads_-_a_g8_action_plan.html [hereinafter G-8 2003 Action
Plan]; Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, World Customs Organization Endorses Plan to Secure
and Improve the Flow of Global Trade (Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/2004_press_releases/122004/12092004.xml;
Randall Beisecker, Securing and Facilitating Trade: Conflicting Goals under the World Customs Organization,
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/051222.htm;
Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1348. See also infra Part V.A.1.
51

Preliminary Entry, 19 C.F.R. § 4.8 (2001).
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a vessel’s departure for the United States.52 From a commercial and practical perspective this
approach made a good deal of sense: only after a vessel had been loaded could its exact contents
be determined, and just-in-time inventory and delivery pressures made a load first, document
second approach attractive.

After the events of September 11, 2001, however, the U.S. government viewed this
traditional state of affairs as unacceptable, since it meant that vessels with undeclared cargo were
on the high seas en route to U.S. ports, and there was no way for the U.S. government to verify
the accuracy of any manifests prior to arrival. Accordingly, in August 2002, U.S. Customs (now
CBP) Commissioner Bonner proposed regulations “requiring sea carriers [at foreign ports] to
provide cargo manifests 24 hours prior to the lading of cargo for shipment [to the United
States].”53 This requirement, commonly known as the “24 Hour Rule,” became effective on
December 2, 2002, 54 although Customs did not begin actively enforcing the rule until May 2003,
in large part to give shippers additional time to adjust to the rule.55 Failure to provide all

52

Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs Before Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port for
Transport to the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 66318, 66319 (Oct. 31, 2002) (to be codified, inter alia, at 19 C.F.R. §
4.8); Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1333; Clyne, supra note 1, at 1183.
53

Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs Before Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port for
Transport to the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. at 66319; Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Customs
Issues “No-Load” Directives on the 24-Hour Rule (Feb. 13. 2003), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/022003/02132003.x
ml.
54

Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs Before Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port for
Transport to the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. at 66319. Containers covered by the rule include both containers
destined for the United States and containers being transshipped to other destinations via U.S. ports. Id. at 66320;
Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1333. See also U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Frequently Asked Questions: 24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule (April 16, 2004), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/carriers/24hour_rule/24hour_faq.ctt/24hour_faq.doc.
55

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, CBP Expands Enforcement of the 24-Hour Rule (May 1, 2003),
available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/carriers/24hour_rule /cbp_24hr.ctt/cbp_24hr.doc; U.S.
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Frequently Asked Questions: 24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule
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information required can result in CBP issuing a “No-Load” directive instructing the shipper not
to load and ship the container; in delays in unlading at the U.S. port; in denial of entry to U.S.
ports; and in civil monetary penalties.56

In terms of form, much of the 24 Hour Rule is procedural, in that it simply changes the
timing of when manifest information must be submitted to the U.S. government. This alone is
significant.57 Yet the 24 Hour Rule also effects a fundamentally important substantive alteration
in how the U.S. inbound cargo supply chain operates, because through this rule the United States
government can block the departure of shipments from foreign ports. Prior to the 24 Hour Rule,
the U.S. government could turn back shipments at the U.S. port, but it could not mandate
whether a vessel in a foreign port could be loaded or depart. In essence, then, the 24 Hour Rule
results in the forward deployment of key administrative functions for import shipments to the
United States, and thus extends U.S. jurisdiction or effective control over critical aspects of
foreign port activity. As noted further in Part V of this article, advance reporting of shipment
information has been endorsed by the WCO, G-8, and European Union as an important element
(Apr. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/carriers/24hour_rule/24hour_faq.ctt/24hour_faq.doc.
56

See Presentation of Vessel Cargo Declaration to Customs Before Cargo Is Laden Aboard Vessel at Foreign Port
for Transport to the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. at 66319; Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Customs Issues “No-Load” Directives on the 24-Hour Rule (Feb. 13. 2003), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/022003/02132003.x
ml. See also U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Customs 24 Hour Rule FAQs, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/carriers/ 24hour_rule/.
Issuance of a “No-Load” directive often leads to a request for the container to be inspected; if the foreign
port participates in CSI the inspection can be carried out under that program. See Customs 24 Hour Rule FAQs,
supra.
57

Prior to the 24 Hour Rule, goods for a particular vessel could be shipped to the foreign port on a rolling basis and
laden as they arrived, and the shipping manifest could be prepared after vessel departure. Under the 24 Hour Rule,
shippers now must first identify all vessel cargo, store it at the dock, prepare the manifest, and then wait a minimum
of 24 hours before any lading may begin. This adds significantly to time and expense for shipments bound for the
United States. For further discussion of commercial concerns raised by the 24 Hour Rule, see Clyne, supra note 1,
at 1206-07.
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of cargo security programs.58

C.

Advance Notification for Overland and Airborne Shipments
Advance notification of imports by truck, train, or air following September 11, 2001, was

deemed desirable for the same security reasons as for ocean cargo, but the reduced timeframes
for overland and airborne cargo presented particular logistical problems. Twenty-four hours of
advance notice prior to loading (or even prior to arrival at the border) was considered an
unacceptable burden on these more rapid forms of shipment.59 Accordingly, CBP issued a final
rule in 2003 requiring electronic submission of specified cargo information at least 30 minutes
prior to arrival for shipments by truck and at least 2 hours’ advance notice for shipments by
rail.60 For shipments by air from North America and portions of Central America, submission of
required cargo information was required prior to departure, whereas for shipments by air from all
other destinations cargo information submission was required within 4 hours of arrival.61 Again,
these modified advance notification requirements were intended to forward deploy the reporting
requirement away from the U.S. border or point of arrival, while also taking into account the
desire to minimize interruptions to inbound trade flows.

58

See infra Part V.A.1.

59

It has been noted, for example, that a transborder shipment across Ambassador Bridge from Windsor, Ontario to
Detroit, Michigan took an average time of 24.1 minutes prior to September 11, 2001. Joseph L. Parks, The United
States-Canada Smart Border Action Plan: Life in the Fast Lane, 10 SPG L. & BUS. REV. AM. 395 n.17 (2004).
Adding 24 hours of lead time to such shipments would increase the shipping cycle more than 48-fold.
60

Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Required Advance Electronic
Presentation of Cargo Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 68140, 68173-174 (Dec. 5, 2003) (codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 123.91123.92). Advance electronic cargo information submission was mandated by section 343 of the Trade Act of 2002,
as modified by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. See Maritime Transportation and Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 104, 116 Stat. 2064, 2085 (2002).

61

Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Required Advance Electronic
Presentation of Cargo Information, 68 Fed. Reg. at 68170-171 (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 123.48a).
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D.

The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (“C-TPAT”)
In November 2001, Customs (now CBP) launched a program called the “Customs-Trade

Partnership Against Terrorism,” more commonly referred to by the awkward acronym “CTPAT.”62 C-TPAT is aimed at identifying and eliminating weaknesses in U.S. importer supply
chains such as poor security procedures and unvetted foreign suppliers and shippers.63 Improved
supply chain security is intended to translate into reduced potential for smuggled weapons and
other illicit goods, and the use of vetted supply chain actors is intended to reduce the need for
delay-causing inspections.64

C-TPAT is structured as a voluntary “partnership” between CBP and the private sector
that incentivizes U.S. importers to identify and ascertain, at their own expense,65 the veracity of
all actors in their international supply chains—including shippers, wholesalers, and intermediate
62

For those encountering this acronym for the first time, invariably the first question asked is, “How is this
pronounced?” Based on the author’s own experience, the proper pronunciation of C-TPAT is “Cee Tee Pat”—
which is probably the most viable of a limited number of options.
63

See Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Validation Process Guidelines (Jan. 23, 2003), available
at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/
ctpat/validation_process_guidelines.ctt/validation_process_guidelines.pdf; Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, C-TPAT Importer Security Criteria (Mar. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/criteria_importers/
ctpat_importer_criteria.xml; Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) Security Criteria for Importers: Implementation Plan (Mar. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/
ctpat/criteria_importers/implementation_plan.ctt/criteriaImplementation2.doc.
64

Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1347; Glick, supra note 1, at 632-633. For a discussion of possible
scenarios involving the use of supply chains for terrorist attacks, see Stephen E. Flynn, Bolstering the Maritime
Weak Link (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/120601flynn.htm (testimony before
U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee).
65

In this regard, C-TPAT is thematically similar to previous efforts to modernize U.S. customs law by placing
greater legal compliance responsibilities more on the shoulders of the private sector. It also is similar to the selfcompliance structure of U.S. export control laws. See Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act,
NAFTA Implementation Act, tit. II, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3331-35; Bowman, supra note 12, at 319, 320-22 nn. 7 & 9.
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consignees—all the way back to the original vendor of each product.66 C-TPAT importers are
expected to identify weak points in their supply chains and take measures to address these
concerns, such as finding new vendors or carriers or compelling existing ones to modify their
operations or procedures; altering shipping routes; employing tamper-proof cargo container
seals; and so on.67 By extending the application of C-TPAT principles backward along the full
supply chain, U.S. government-supported security measures and principles are thus to be applied
in circumstances where previously the United States had little influence or reach. In CBP
parlance, this is a “layered, defense-in-depth strategy against terrorism.”68

In return for participating in the C-TPAT program, U.S. importers gain the benefit of

66

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Strategic Plan (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpa
t_strategicplan.pdf; Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Security Criteria for Importers: Implementation Plan (Mar. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/
ctpat/criteria_importers/implementation_plan.ctt/criteriaImplementation2.doc. Participation in C-TPAT initially
was limited to U.S. importers, although later the program was opened to other international supply chain actors such
as customs brokers, freight forwarders, and non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs). Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection, Customs Set to Begin Phase 3 of Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (Aug. 21,
2002), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/
cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/legacy/2002/82002/08212002.xml. These non-importers primarily benefit
from C-TPAT participation by being “approved” suppliers of services for C-TPAT importers. See infra text
accompanying notes 70-71.
67

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Strategic Plan at 26-27 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/
ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_strategicplan.pdf. Thus, in a sense, C-TPAT is a U.S. government effort to get U.S.
importers to engage in flow-charting or process-charting of their import supply chains, much in the same way that
businesses prepare process charts to identify problems such as reporting gaps or redundancies in management
structures or production processes.
68

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Strategic Plan at 7 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/
ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_strategicplan.pdf.
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reduced U.S. import inspections and expedited customs processing.69

Other C-TPAT

participants such as freight forwarders, shippers, and even manufacturers benefit by being
viewed as C-TPAT-compliant providers of supply chain services, which (at least in theory)
places them at a competitive advantage to secure business from C-TPAT participants. CBP
recently issued separate guidelines for various types of C-TPAT participants such as carriers,
customs brokers, suppliers and port operators.70

CBP has also issued a “best practices”

document to assist C-TPAT participants.71

In other words, CBP has employed what one commentator aptly describes as a “carrotand-stick approach” to encouraging “voluntary” C-TPAT participation.72 This approach has
been spectacularly successful: as of January 2006 C-TPAT had over 10,000 participants, up
from only seven at the program’s inception three years earlier.73 These participants included

69

See Glick, supra note 1, at 634-635. These benefits are offered largely on the theory that C-TPAT shipments are
more secure, although a report to Congress by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised questions
about whether this theory holds up in application. See GAO 2003 KEY CARGO SECURITY REPORT, supra note 41, at
5 (statement of Richard M. Stana). The GAO (previously called the General Accounting Office) also was critical of
CBP’s implementation of both C-TPAT and CSI in 2003. See GAO 2003 CSI REPORT, supra note 41. See also
Lipton, supra note 46.
70

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for Air Carriers (Apr. 24, 2006);
U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for Air Freight Consolidators, Ocean
Transportation Intermediaries and Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs) (Apr. 24, 2006); U.S.
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for Licensed U.S. Customs Brokers (Apr.
24, 2006); U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for Manufacturers (Apr. 24,
2006); U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for Rail Carriers (Apr. 24,
2006); U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Security Guidelines for U.S. Marine or Port
Terminal Operators (Apr. 24, 2006). All of these documents are available through CBP’s website at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/security_guideline/.
71

U.S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY BEST PRACTICES CATALOG:
CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM (C-TPAT) iii (2006), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_best_practices.ctt/ctpat_best_pra
ctices.pdf [hereinafter C-TPAT BEST PRACTICES CATALOG].
72

See Glick, supra note 1, at 634.

73

C-TPAT BEST PRACTICES CATALOG, supra note 71, at iii.
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nearly 90 of the top 100 U.S. importers by volume and represented over 95 percent of U.S.
containerized imports.74 Such high levels of participation perhaps call into question whether CTPAT is voluntary in form only.

In addition to promoting C-TPAT as a means of securing supply chains for U.S. imports,
CBP also holds C-TPAT out as a model for securing supply chains worldwide. CBP has sought,
with considerable success, to “internationalize the core principles of C-TPAT through
cooperation and coordination with the international community,”75 and has obtained both WCO
and G-8 support for these efforts. 76 As with efforts to obtain multilateral support for CSI and the
24 Hour Rule, the internationalization of C-TPAT has significant legal and practical implications
for the international trade landscape.

E.

Free and Secure Trade (“FAST”) Program for North America
Free and Secure Trade, or FAST, is a border initiative between the United States, Canada,

and Mexico that is designed, like C-TPAT and CSI, to simultaneously facilitate trade and ensure

74

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Strategic Plan at 13 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/
ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_strategicplan.pdf.
75

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, C-TPAT Importer Security Criteria, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/criteria_importers/ ctpat_importer_criteria.xml.
76

See European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General, Customs and Security, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/index_en.htm; G-8 2003
Action Plan, supra note 50; Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, World Customs Organization
Endorses Plan to Secure and Improve the Flow of Global Trade (Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/2004_press_releases/122004/12092004.xml;
Schoenbaum & Langston, supra note 1, at 1348. See also infra Part V.A.1.
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security in light of the events of September 11, 2001.77 The focus of FAST is on North
American supply chains, and in this regard it is intended to be complementary of C-TPAT,
which is global in scope. Pursuant to FAST the United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed
to harmonize and coordinate border processing procedures for truck and rail shipments among
the three nations.78

As with other U.S. border programs such as CSI, an expressly stated goal of FAST is to
push activities related to security clearance away from the physical border. Specifically, point 15
of FAST’s 30-Point Action Plan reads as follows: “Clearance Away From The Border: [FAST
is intended to] [d]evelop an integrated approach to improve security and facilitate trade through
away-from-the-border processing for truck/rail cargo (and crews).”79

Like C-TPAT,

participation by importers and shippers in FAST is technically voluntary, and the U.S.
government employs a similar “carrot-and-stick” approach to encourage participation—namely,
FAST participation offers reduced border processing times and fewer inspections of cross-border
shipments at designated border crossings. 80

77
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, FAST Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/fast/fast.ctt/FASTBrochure
.doc [hereinafter FAST Fact Sheet].
78

Id. As with NAFTA, the genesis of the FAST program was a bilateral agreement between the United States and
Canada.
79

Press Release, Office of Homeland Security, Specifics of Secure and Smart Border Action Plan (Jan. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0036.xml.

80

FAST Fact Sheet, supra note 77; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, FAST Reference Guide: Enhancing the
Security and Safety of Trans-border Shipments (2005), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/fast/fast_ref_guide.ctt/fast_ref_guide.p
df.
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IV.

Political Geography and “Pushing the Border Outward”
The programs discussed above involve the transfer of certain U.S. government functions

traditionally associated with national borders or border security to points well outside the
territory or physical jurisdiction of the United States.

This occurs either through moving

functions traditionally associated with borders to sites outside the geographical United States
(such as cargo inspection under CSI); by requiring the advance reporting of cargo information,
with an eye toward preventing the foreign departure of potentially problematic shipments (such
as the 24 Hour Rule) or at least more effectively identifying and stopping shipments prior to the
border (such as FAST); or by extending de facto U.S. jurisdiction over foreign parties via a
supply chain security program (C-TPAT). In short, these programs represent an important shift
in U.S. border functionality.

Certain works from the field of political geography have a great deal to offer in the
analysis of these U.S. border initiatives. While there is some debate over the boundaries of that
field, it does include, at least as a subset, the study of “the relationship between geographical
factors and political entities.”81 These works help both to highlight significant commonalities
among these U.S. government programs and to place these programs in a proper thematic
context. This article is of course not intended to provide a full overview of political geography;
rather, it is meant to harness certain political geography writings and concepts for the purpose of
better understanding and analyzing post-September 11, 2001, U.S. border security initiatives

81

HANS W. WEIGERT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 5-8 (1957); see also MARTIN JONES ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: SPACE, PLACE AND POLITICS 173 (2004) [hereinafter SPACE, PLACE AND
POLITICS].
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from a legal perspective.82

For purposes of this article, there are two lines of political geographic inquiry that aid in
analysis of current U.S. border initiatives. Each was developed in the early or mid-twentieth
century during times of political upheaval and fluid national boundaries. It is thus quite fitting
that they are conceptually relevant to current U.S. efforts to redefine border functions in the face
of the new security challenges posed by modern terrorism. These studies provide a useful
framework for analyzing current U.S. efforts to “push the border outward,” since in essence
current U.S. border security efforts are aimed at identifying border functions considered crucial
to U.S. national security and performing them at points well-removed from the actual, physical
border—in other words, forward deploying these traditional border features or functions.

A.

Political Geography Terminology
Before discussing these lines of geographic inquiry, however, it is first useful to define

some key terms. This is especially important because political geography scholarship has not
always used consistent terminology, with the predictable effect of occasional confusion and

82

Early- and mid-twentieth century political geography writings are most helpful for purposes of this article because
they focused largely on identifying, justifying, and describing the nature, functions, and establishment of national
boundaries or borders. This focus should not be taken to suggest that there have been no substantive developments
in the field of political geography since that time. Especially since the 1970s there has been robust literature in this
discipline on a variety of topics—one of which has been a debate over the discipline’s very scope. See, e.g., SPACE,
PLACE AND POLITICS, supra note 81, at 2 (reviewing competing definitions of the field and advocating a broad
definition of political geography as “a cluster of work within the social sciences that engages with the multiple
intersections of ‘politics’ and ‘geography’”); JOHN RENNIE SHORT, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 12 (1993) (discussing historical evolution of political geography’s scope); KEVIN R. COX, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY:
TERRITORY, STATE AND SOCIETY 1 (2002) (recommending a narrower, essentialist definition of political geography
based on—and hence limited by—the “defining concepts” of “territory and territoriality”), cited in SPACE, PLACE
AND POLITICS, supra note 81, at 2. This latter definition is more consistent with earlier definitions of the field as
“the relationship between geographical factors and political entities.” See WEIGERT ET AL., supra note 81, at 5-8.
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implied distinctions where none exists.83

First, a perusal of the cited political geography texts reveals that they eschew the term
“border” in favor of “boundary” (or “international boundary”). This article, however,
predominantly will use the term “border” to refer to the demarcation between sovereign nation
states.84 This usage is adopted in order to avoid confusion, since “border” is the term used by the
U.S. government in discussing post-September 11, 2001, security efforts—and in any event the
terms “border” and “boundary” are synonymous in ordinary parlance.85

Second, the term “frontier” has suffered frequently from poor definition in the field of
political geography. Often it has been used interchangeably with the term “boundary,”86 while at
other times it has denoted different types of transitional zones.87 For purposes of this article, it is
sufficient to distinguish between borders (or boundaries) and frontiers by noting that “‘frontier’
83

See J.R.V. PRESCOTT, GEOGRAPHY OF FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES 13 (1965); WEIGERT ET AL., supra note 81, at
7. One notable attempt to clarify political geography terminology sought to distinguish between the terms
“boundary” and “frontier.” Ladis K.D. Kristof, The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries, 49 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N
OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 269 (1959).
84

See C.B. FAWCETT, FRONTIERS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 5 (1918) (“the phrase ‘international
boundary’ is so generally used to denote a boundary between sovereign states that it has been impossible to avoid
using it in this sense”).
85

See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, FOURTH EDITION (2000) (defining the
term “border” as “[t]he line or frontier area separating political divisions or geographic regions; a boundary,” and
similarly defining the term “boundary” as “something that indicates a border or limit” or “the border so indicated”);
Mirriam-Webster OnLine, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=boundary
(defining the word “border” to mean “boundary,” and defining the word “boundary” as “something (as a line, point,
or plane) that indicates or fixes a limit or extent”).
86

PRESCOTT, supra note 83, at 13 (criticizing interchangeable use of these terms by other commentators); FAWCETT,
supra note 84, at 6. See also generally George Nathanial Curzon, Romanes Lecture on the Subject of Frontiers,
University of Oxford (1907), available at http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/links.html; S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS,
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: A STUDY OF BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 22 (1940).
87

For example, distinctions are sometimes made between “frontiers of separation” versus “frontiers of intercourse or
pressure.” FAWCETT, supra note 84, at 6; PRESCOTT, supra note 83, at 16-17.
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denotes an area, and ‘boundary’ a line.”88

Third, the term “buffer state” has been used in political geography to convey multiple
concepts.89 For present purposes, the most appropriate definitions are that a buffer state is a state
“located in the path of an enemy advance,”90 or alternatively a state whose “territory separates
those of two or more other states, thus preventing direct contact . . . .”91

One political

geographer correctly noted at the outset of World War II that buffer states are not strictly
boundaries, but they do “require consideration somewhat analogous” to boundaries since they
have some of the same effects.92

B.

Two Lines of Political Geography Inquiry:

Defensive Borders and Border

Taxonomies
With these definitions in mind, it is useful to apply two particular lines of political
geography inquiry to current U.S. efforts to enhance cargo security by “pushing the border
outward.”

88

PRESCOTT, supra note 83, at 6; BOGGS, supra note 86, at 22. In the words of one early twentieth century
commentator, “[Political] frontiers are thus essentially transition areas—zones in which the characters and
influences of two or more different regions or states come together” to a greater or lesser extent. FAWCETT, supra
note 84, at 24. In similar fashion, Kristof characterized boundaries (borders) as “inner-oriented” and frontiers as
“outer-oriented.” Kristof, supra note 83, at 270-271.
89

STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN, TREATY EDITORS AND BOUNDARY
COMMISSIONERS 14 (1945) [hereinafter BOUNDARY-MAKING HANDBOOK].
90

Id. In the early- and mid-twentieth century, Belgium was commonly cited as a prime example of a buffer state
between Germany and France.

91

Id.

92

BOGGS, supra note 86, at 27.
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1.

Lord Curzon of Kedleston and the Passes to India

In 1907, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon—former British Viceroy of India and future
British Foreign Minister—became one of the first commentators to attempt to establish a
taxonomy of border types.93 In his Romanes Lecture at the University of Oxford that year, Lord
Curzon drew upon his experiences in India to analyze the nature of borders and frontiers. Much
of his lecture was devoted to distinguishing between what he called “natural” borders, such as
oceans, mountains, deserts, or mountain ranges, and “artificial” borders, such as frontiers or
buffer zones. In so doing, he concentrated heavily on the defensive aspects of frontiers or
borders.94

In particular, Lord Curzon spoke of the natural advantages of having oceans as frontiers,
since they constituted a physical space difficult to cross, as well as using mountain ranges as
boundaries, since they offered defensive advantages and limited passes through which enemy
forces could approach.95 In essence, his view was that the security of territorial holdings could
be best achieved by using natural features as borders, by maintaining a broad perimeter, and by
concentrating border security efforts at defensive pressure points.96

The natural-versus-artificial border dichotomy set forth by Lord Curzon largely has been
93

For biographical information on Lord Curzon of Kedleston, see Curzon, George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess,
Viscount Scarsdale, Baron Ravensdale, Encyclopedia Britannica Online (2006), available at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9028300.
94

Curzon, supra note 86.

95

Id.

96

Id..
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abandoned, and in fact his analysis contained the seeds of its own destruction.97

He

acknowledged, for example, that oceans were not only barriers but also avenues of commerce,
and that technological advances such as the locomotive could render deserts useless as
frontiers.98 Yet his focus on defensive aspects of borders and frontiers continues to translate well
by analogy to U.S. efforts to secure its borders against terrorism. Modern U.S. measures to
require advance cargo reporting and inspection do establish a security perimeter—in the sense
that there is advance notice of what is being imported into the United States, how it is being
imported, and by whom—so that any additional security measures can be taken in advance of the
shipment’s arrival at the actual U.S. border. Furthermore, the establishment of U.S. personnel at
key foreign ports through the CSI program and private sector efforts (through C-TPAT) to ensure
supply chain security through these foreign ports are conceptually similar to concentration of
defensive efforts at mountain passes, since in both cases defensive efforts and resources are
devoted to monitoring and restricting passage through a finite set of vulnerable transit nodes.

In other words, Lord Curzon’s analysis of borders, with its concentration on defensive
concerns, transcends the time period in which his comments were made. His observations on the
defensive functions of borders, when combined with later efforts to develop border taxonomies
and lists of border functions, help provide cogent insight into modern U.S. efforts to improve
national security through the forward deployment of cargo security functions.99
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2.

Border Taxonomies and Border Functions

Various political geographers in the early twentieth century sought to develop a working
taxonomy of border types and their respective characteristics and advantages.100 Subsequent
commentators worked to objectively identify and describe proper border functions. These two
approaches, while distinct, are in many ways complementary and are therefore discussed
together below.

International borders have been discussed by political geography scholars in evolutionary
terms—namely, as shifting over time from less-defined tribal boundaries to more established
frontiers and thence to clearly demarcated borders.101 In the words of one commentator, the
general evolution of international borders had led to an end product of “sharply defined lines,
fixed by nations like fences between their respective properties.”102 Mid-twentieth century
American political geographers worked to objectively identify and discuss the appropriate
functions of distinct national borders,103 with principle border functions including the
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administration of customs laws and the prevention of smuggling and other illegal imports.104
The implicit assumption in these works was that these functions would occur at or near the
physical border.

U.S. import cargo security measures following September 11, 2001, suggest that an
important countertrend is underway from a cargo security perspective. Prior to September 11,
2001, border functions involving imports fit the above model and occurred at or near the physical
border, if they occurred at all, and functionally this approach was consistent with having borders
that were “sharply defined lines” or “fences.”105 Under post-September 11 programs such as CTPAT and CSI, problematic cargo now may be identified well in advance of arrival at the
physical U.S. border and can be singled out for inspection at foreign ports. Under the 24-Hour
Rule, vessels in foreign ports can be denied authority to load goods bound for the United States.
Non-ocean shipments must report their arrival in advance and can be denied port entry.

From a national security/cargo security perspective, then, the United States has gone back
in time in terms of border function and conception. Historically, the movement toward borders
as “sharply defined lines” was viewed as the logical—indeed, the inevitable—evolutionary
outcome. The post-9/11 U.S. conception of the border in the cargo context, however, quickly
has devolved into something far more akin to ill-defined frontiers than to fences. Alternatively,
this atavistic trend can be conceptualized as the use of foreign countries as “buffer states” that
are “located in the path of an enemy advance” or whose territory separates the United States
from the harmful activities of terrorists, thus preventing these unwanted shipments from having
104
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“direct contact” with the U.S. homeland.106 In this way, the United States can allow risky cargo
inspection activities to occur not at the actual U.S. border, but rather abroad in “buffer states.”
These foreign states thus bear all the security risk involved in these inspections, while the benefit
of increased cargo security is shared between the United States and these foreign countries.

This core-versus-periphery analysis has an interesting flip side, of course, because the
CSI program is bilateral in form, and other countries are taking steps similar to CSI, C-TPAT
and the other programs discussed above under a multilateral WCO framework.107 One therefore
could view the United States as a buffer zone or buffer state for those trading partners that have
based customs inspectors at U.S. ports (currently only Canada and Japan) or that have imposed
supply chain requirements that affect portions of the supply chain internal to the United States.
Not surprisingly, this mirror-image conception of these programs has not featured prominently in
U.S. government descriptions of these programs, and in fact one might question how willing the
United States is to have these programs operate in a truly bilateral or reciprocal fashion, at least
in terms of the programs’ restrictive or cost-imposing effects on domestic U.S. activity. A recent
study funded by the government of Canada, for example, concluded that the Canadian trucking
industry has borne significant costs in complying with post-9/11 U.S. border security programs
but has received little benefit from voluntary participation in trade-facilitating aspects of these
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U.S. programs (in terms of reduced inspection and border delay times).108 It is not far-fetched to
posit that if foreign border security programs—those mirroring CSI, C-TPAT and the other
programs discussed above—were found to impose significant compliance costs on outbound
U.S. trade, the United States might seek to have these programs adjusted or minimized in order
to reduce the domestic U.S. impact, while still keeping its mirror-image cargo security programs
fully in place. Such scenarios thus could raise questions concerning the legitimacy and legality
of these U.S. programs, as discussed below in Part V.

V.

Considerations of Legality
The zeal with which the U.S. government has pursued its various cargo security programs

to “push the border outward” has resulted in the United States having further extended its
practical control and effective jurisdictional reach over cargo imports outward from the United
States and into foreign jurisdictions. Such forward deployment of border functions has raised
concerns regarding both these programs’ legality under international law and their practical
effect.109 This section addresses each of these concerns in turn, with particular emphasis on the
multilateral versus bilateral (or unilateral) aspects of these programs.

As an initial matter, it must be pointed out that the validity of these programs can be seen
as resting on the consent of U.S. trading partners and supply chain participants. This is true
regardless of whether the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the United States under these
programs is characterized as prescriptive jurisdiction (e.g., via implementation of cargo security
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requirements), enforcement jurisdiction (e.g., the ability to compel compliance or cooperation
with these requirements), or adjudicatory jurisdiction (e.g., the authority to certify or de-certify
participants in cargo security programs such as C-TPAT), or some combination of the three.110
This is also true regardless of whether the underlying international law principle for such
extraterritorial jurisdiction is the protective principle, subjective territorial jurisdiction, passive
personality jurisdiction, or even (although currently unlikely) universal jurisdiction.111
Accordingly, this article focuses on consent as the key factor in justifying extraterritorial
jurisdiction under these programs, as opposed to trying to fit extraterritorial jurisdiction into one
or more of the traditional forms or principles of jurisdiction.

With this in mind, it can be seen that multilateral consent to these U.S. cargo security
programs is a strong current justification for their extraterritorial application, but it is not an
infallible one. It is entirely possible that multilateral consent could be withdrawn, in whole or in
part, by the United States’ trading partners in response to perceived U.S. overreaching.
Fortunately, there are other justifications for these programs that appear far more resistant to
such objections. Interestingly, the strongest legal justification for these programs’ extraterritorial
effect and their infringement on foreign sovereignty appears to be the implicit consent to these
programs by the United States’ foreign trading partners or supply chain participants. This rather
counter-intuitive conclusion is explored at the end of this section.
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A.

Multilateral Considerations
1.

The Growth in Multilateral Support for U.S. Cargo Security Programs

When CSI, C-TPAT and the other programs discussed above were first launched,
concerns were raised about their legality or validity under international law, with particular
emphasis on how CSI and its sibling programs might interfere with traditional notions of
sovereignty and jurisdiction.112 These concerns were grounded in large part in the traditional
notion of Westphalian state sovereignty and the role of states as unitary actors.113 While there
are currently challenges to the view of nation-states as unitary, it remains a foundational element
of the current international order, including state sovereignty and exercise of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, analysis of these cargo security programs from a unitary nation-state perspective is
an important part of exploring possible legal justifications for these programs.114

Two primary aspects of Westphalian sovereignty relevant to current U.S. efforts to “push
the border outward” are the ability of states to enter into agreements with one another and their
ability to regulate inbound and outbound flows of commercial activity.115 Early in the life of the
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CSI program, concerns were expressed that while CSI agreements were structured as bilateral,
consensual agreements, they nonetheless were weighted heavily in favor of U.S. interests and
could be considered non-consensual surrenders of sovereignty by a series of weaker states to a
much stronger United States.116 In contract law terms, this concern might be styled as one over
contracts of adhesion or contracts between presumptively rational actors with highly unequal
bargaining power.117 States in fact can be viewed as market actors that, in their relations with
one another, agree to relinquish certain aspects of power or sovereignty in exchange for other
benefits (in this case, improved cargo security).118 However, if a state has little or no discretion
over a particular agreement, that might bring the consensual nature of the agreement—and
perhaps its validity—into question.

With respect to the second feature, concerns have been expressed that U.S. cargo security
programs unilaterally imposed by the United States, such as the C-TPAT program or the 24 Hour
Rule and its “Do Not Load” orders, might impermissibly intrude on commercial activities in
foreign states. This concern is largely driven by the notion that control and influence over
ordinary internal commercial activities primarily should be the province of the state in which the
activity occurs—something often considered an essential element of Westphalian or territorial
sovereignty.
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In the few years since their inception, CSI and its related programs have gained
substantial multilateral support through the EU, G-8, and WCO, and this support can be seen as
substantially reducing doubt over the legitimacy and propriety of these U.S. cargo security
programs in their current incarnations. As stated by one observer, such support essentially
constitutes the “internationalization” of U.S. cargo security policy.119 In particular, a U.S.-EU
cargo security agreement expressly “[s]upport[s] the objectives of the [U.S.] Container Security
Initiative” and advocates the expansion of CSI to all EU ports.120

This agreement also

encourages U.S. reciprocity in such matters through the promotion of “comparable” cargo
security standards in U.S. ports; backs the joint development of “minimum standards” for cargo
risk management; and establishes a working group of U.S. and EU member customs personnel to
propose recommendations in such matters.121 In like fashion, G-8 members have pledged to
“work[ ] together to reinforce container security arrangements generally” and have pledged to
support development of “joint standards and guidelines for electronic transmission of customs
data for cargo” (to facilitate pre-shipment reporting such as under the U.S. 24 Hour Rule) and the
further expansion of the CSI program.122

The WCO’s members similarly have adopted the Framework of Standards to Secure and
Facilitate Global Trade, which rests on several key principles aimed at harmonizing customs
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reporting and risk assessment procedures in order to maximize inspection capability and lower
transactions costs and delays.123 One of these principles is that a country “should conduct
outbound security inspection of high-risk containers and cargo at the reasonable request of the
importing country.”124

A second principle is that advance reporting of imports should be

required, much along the lines of the U.S. 24 Hour Rule. A third WCO Framework principle
advocates the development of government-private sector “partnerships” along the lines of CTPAT, in order to promote supply chain security.125 To date, a substantial number of WCO
member states have submitted declarations of intent to implement the WCO Framework through
their domestic laws.126

Regardless of the form of these EU, G-8, and WCO statements (i.e., binding agreements
or nonbinding statements of support or consensus), such broad multilateral support and
consensus for these U.S. programs suggest these countries do not currently consider these U.S.
cargo security programs to impermissibly infringe on their sovereignty or to be jurisdictional
overreaching by the United States. This support is significant, since the countries involved
represent the United States’ primary trading partners.127

Circular though it may be, such

significant multilateral agreement or consensus concerning these programs can be viewed as
123
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legitimizing the programs’ extraterritorial application or effect.

Such multilateral consensus also could be viewed as the emergence of an international
cargo security regime under which participating countries consensually agree to the
extraterritorial application of each others’ cargo security rules, within certain agreed-upon
parameters.

As such, mutual cooperation in cargo security matters might be seen as a

“cooperative extraterritoriality” regime, pursuant to which countries “agree to extraterritorial
application of other nations’ laws within their national jurisdictions to a mutually agreed-upon
extent.”128 A stable system of interconnected or harmonized cargo security rules could perhaps
be seen as a cooperative effort to “institutionalize and mutualize” extraterritorial jurisdiction in
cargo security matters.129

2.

Similarities to Foreign Embassy and Consular Activities

Lending further support to the legitimacy of post-9/11 U.S. cargo security programs is the
fact that the forward deployment of cargo inspection activities, at the expense of local state
sovereignty, is similar to certain activities of U.S. embassies and consulates abroad.

In

particular, U.S. embassy and consular personnel stationed abroad regularly process visa
applications for foreign persons seeking U.S. entry,130 and the performance of these functions
abroad can be seen to enhance U.S. security, since potential visa recipients remain outside the
128
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United States and away from actual U.S. borders until they have been vetted for security and
other concerns. In the case of both visa processing and cargo review and inspection, U.S.
government personnel are thus engaged in border- and security-related screening functions that,
but for the forward deployment of these screening activities, would take place within the United
States or at its borders. In the case of CSI, reviewing U.S. personnel are actually stationed
abroad, like their U.S. consular counterparts. The performance of visa review and issuance
activities abroad is not considered controversial or in violation of international law principles,
and the same argument can be made by analogy with respect to cargo screening activities
performed abroad.

Stated differently, and perhaps more succinctly, the United States has for some years
engaged in the forward deployment of visa processing functions, with little objection or
consternation from its international trading partners. Forward deployment of cargo screening
and security measures can be seen as the extension of this same function from the realm of
visitor and immigrant screening, where it is already well-established, to that of U.S. inbound
cargo screening, which traditionally has not been performed abroad.

3.

Potential Difficulties with the Multilateral Support Justification for U.S. Cargo
Security Programs

As the above discussion makes clear, the United States has sought to sidestep objections
to its cargo security programs by advocating their adoption as multilateral programs. Yet one
might question whether the United States means what it says about the multilateral nature of
these cargo security programs. If the United States, as a dominant actor in world trade, seeks to
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obligate its trading partners to engage in certain cargo security measures while not necessarily
binding itself to similar action, this could undermine the long-term, multilateral support
justification for these programs.

That is, if push comes to shove, will the United States honor the multilateral aspects of
these programs when it is not in the United States’ interests to do so? The United States
generally has honored the aforementioned diplomatic and consular commitments. Will the same
occur in the cargo security context, or will the United States insist that other nations abide by
their commitments under these programs while not reciprocally honoring its own? Alternatively,
will the United States apply ostensibly equal standards to itself and its trading partners, but
interpret its trading partners’ obligations more strictly than its own obligations? Just how
“comparable” will U.S. cargo security measures be in comparison to those required for EU ports
under CSI?131

“Comparable” does not mean “identical,” and there certainly is room for

maneuver or debate as to what is and is not comparable. It might be, for example, the U.S.
government’s position—official or otherwise—that U.S. outbound shipments are less likely to
suffer from the same security dangers of inbound shipments, and the government might be less
willing to impede them.

Political or legal realist arguments thus can be made that despite all official
pronouncements of multilateral support for these U.S.-initiated cargo security programs, the
countries involved know there is a double standard at play, and that other countries are expected
to fully honor their commitments even if the United States chooses not to do so. To the extent
131
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this is the case, it could weaken the multilateral justification for these cargo security programs.

The point of this article is not to enter directly into the debate over realist views of
international law.132 Rather, the purpose here is to explore possible legal justifications for these
U.S. cargo security programs and the programs’ implications for global trade. Multilateral
support is certainly significant—and perhaps sufficient—legal support for these programs, and
multilateral approval is undoubtedly desirable, both from the legal and the political perspective.
Yet multilateralism is not unassailable as a legal justification for these programs. It therefore is
worth exploring bilateral or unilateral bases for legally justifying the extraterritorial effect or
application of these U.S.-led cargo security programs. To the extent any bilateral or unilateral
justifications provide a stronger basis of legality, they may be preferable.

B.

Bilateral and Unilateral Considerations
Assume for the sake of argument that official multilateral support for these U.S. cargo

security programs fades. Does this bring the legal validity of these programs into question?
What if multilateral opposition arises due to U.S. insistence on regulating its inbound cargo
security programs more strictly than U.S. outbound cargo? This might occur if the United States
refuses to let CSI member states, such as the United Arab Emirates or Malaysia, station customs
personnel in the United States, even though these countries have permitted the stationing of U.S.
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personnel in their ports.133 Opposition to Middle Eastern personnel or companies being involved
in U.S. port security matters is anything but hypothetical, as the demise of the UAE Dubai Ports
World deal in March 2006 clearly illustrates.134 Similarly, the United States might permit UAE
and Malaysian government personnel to be stationed at U.S. ports under CSI, but might regularly
deny their requests to inspect outbound cargo, thus effectively quarantining them from U.S. port
security matters. Multilateral opposition also might arise if under C-TPAT the United States
were to strongly object to foreign countries’ efforts to influence certain U.S. outbound supply
chain activities, but still insist on changes to foreign supply chains bound for the United States.
Such insistence on full foreign cooperation, combined with limited or no U.S. reciprocity, could
reduce or eliminate multilateral support for these programs and any future U.S. cargo security
programs.

If multilateral support for U.S. cargo security programs in fact were to wane, it seems
highly unlikely that the United States would shutter these programs or forego implementation of
new cargo security measures with extraterritorial effects. After all, the driving force behind
these cargo security programs is a unilateral desire to protect the United States, and in fact that is
how the U.S. government repeatedly describes these programs—as efforts to “push the border
outward,” not as efforts to “reciprocally monitor border traffic.” This certainly gives some
credence to a realist view of these programs.

It also means that having alternative legal

justifications for these programs and any future extensions or expansions of them is of
paramount importance to the United States. As explained below, strong bilateral or unilateral
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arguments can be made for the legality of CSI, C-TPAT, and the other cargo security programs
discussed above, on the basis of express or implied consent of the foreign states or parties
involved.

1.

Express Consent

Aside from any widespread multilateral support, some of the current U.S. programs to
“push the border outward” can be viewed individually as voluntary bilateral agreements
expressly entered into by the United States and its foreign trading partners. Such bilateral
agreements between the United States and individual foreign countries are in fact the original
basis for the CSI program. If the agreements are truly voluntary (a view that can be questioned,
as discussed above), then these foreign countries have willingly ceded certain aspects of
sovereignty and have agreed to the extended exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, in return for
potentially greater mutual trade security.135 Thus, the argument goes, any cession of sovereignty
or greater assertion of U.S. jurisdiction is consensual and non-problematic.

From a non-multilateral perspective, U.S. cargo security programs that have been
expressly consented to by foreign states are similar in important respects to U.S. deployments
abroad of military personnel pursuant to “Status of Forces” (SOFA) agreements between the
United States and foreign host countries. Since World War II, the United States has negotiated
and signed separate SOFAs and related leases with a number of foreign nations to enable the
establishment of U.S. military bases in those foreign countries.136 The establishment of these
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bases has been for the purpose of U.S. national security and defense, and by definition these
bases have been forward deployments of U.S. government personnel and military functionality.
The SOFAs themselves are comprehensive agreements that expressly curtail host country
jurisdiction over U.S. base personnel and limit host country sovereignty rights over U.S. base
territory, much in the same way that embassies and consulates (and their personnel) are largely
inviolable.137 The benefit of SOFAs to the United States historically has been the establishment
of a forward line of defense or the use of foreign countries as buffer states, in particular against
communist encroachments during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era U.S. foreign bases
may be used more for preemptive actions and small-scale military operations than for large-scale
defensive deployments, but there is little question that the United States will continue to maintain
substantial forward deployment of military forces via SOFAs.138 The benefit to foreign host
countries generally takes the form of military protection, U.S. goodwill, and the economic
infusion of military personnel and dependents into the local economy. In similar fashion to
SOFAs, U.S. CSI agreements with foreign host countries are bilateral arrangements that
expressly permit U.S. personnel to operate in foreign ports in their official capacities.

Of course, the express agreement justification for U.S. cargo security programs can be
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countered by the contract of adhesion concerns discussed above. The United States will be the
dominant actor in many bilateral cargo security agreements, and it may be able to coerce or
cajole terms that are “voluntary” or “bilateral” in form only. In fact, as noted previously in this
article, such a concern was one of the earliest objections raised to the CSI program.139 With
respect to the C-TPAT program, if one looks past any state-to-state expressions of support for CTPAT and instead concentrates on the underlying voluntary “partnership” agreements between
the U.S. government and private companies involved in inbound U.S. trade, the lack of parity
between the parties could be used to call the express agreement justification even further into
question.

This is not to suggest that the legal justification of express agreement is not valid—
especially to the extent that there is rough parity between the United States and its foreign
trading partners. In this regard, it is worth noting that the United States is increasingly dependent
on inbound trade for its economic health and in recent decades has run a trade deficit in which
U.S. imports significantly exceed exports.140 The United States might appreciate its foreign
trading partners’ concerns with these programs and in some cases might even seek to address
them, rather than ignore them and insist always on its own terms for inbound cargo security.

Rather, the purpose here is to explore justifications for these U.S. cargo security
programs and the weaknesses of these justifications, with a view toward identifying which
139
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U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
GOODS AND SERVICES, ANNUAL REVISION FOR 2004 1 (2005), available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/trad1305.pdf (reporting trade deficits in fiscal years 2002 through
2004 exceeding US$420 billion per year (goods and services)).
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justification or justifications are less susceptible to challenge, and thus preferable. Express
consent does offer support, but it is not unassailable as a legal justification for U.S. cargo
security programs with extraterritorial and potentially sovereignty-infringing effects. As the next
section shows, perhaps the best legal justification for the extraterritorial reach of these U.S. cargo
security programs is based on the notion of implicit consent to these programs by U.S. trading
partners and private actors involved in the U.S. inbound supply chain.

2.

Implicit Consent

Implicit consent has been discussed as a possible basis of validity under international law
for extraterritorial U.S. export control laws, but as explained below it suffers from significant
shortcomings in the export context. These same shortcomings are not present, however, in the
inbound trade context. In addition, implicit consent has the added advantage in the cargo
security environment of not relying for its validity on notions of multilateral consensus or parity
of the parties. Rather, it is best thought of as unilateral in nature.

The United States has long claimed broad extraterritorial jurisdiction through its export
control laws.141 In particular, under these laws the United States currently asserts jurisdiction
over goods, software, and technology (collectively, items) exported from the United States, as
well as items located outside the United States that are of U.S. origin or contain greater than de
minimis U.S. content.142

Thus, the United States claims extraterritorial jurisdiction over
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transactions abroad that involve U.S. origin items or items with certain percentages of U.S.
content, regardless of whether these transactions have any other nexus to the United States or
U.S. commerce.

One justification that has been advanced for such expansive jurisdictional claims is that
foreign parties dealing in items of U.S. origin or content implicitly have agreed to U.S.
extraterritorial jurisdiction over these items.143

Stated differently, extraterritorial U.S.

jurisdiction could be seen as having been implicitly consented to after the fact, due to the U.S.
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origin of the items or a percentage of the items’ content, on the basis that the foreign party knew
or should have known of the items’ U.S. origin or content. This is certainly a creative argument,
but it is fundamentally flawed in the export context, as other observers have noted.144
Specifically, implicit ex post facto acceptance seems directly contrary to the notion of consent,
because “consent” in the form of dealing with U.S. origin or U.S. content items might be
assumed prior to any actual knowledge or real reason to know of U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover,
U.S. jurisdiction over a transaction that is already completed cannot (by definition) be avoided
by declining to participate in the completed transaction, which again is contrary to the notion of
voluntary consent. Thus, a foreign actor would be deemed to have consented implicitly to U.S.
jurisdiction even if that party fully (but erroneously) was convinced that the item involved was
not of U.S. origin or content. Such a justification seems forced at best and disingenuous at
worst.

Such problems do not arise, however, in the converse situation presented by U.S. inbound
cargo security programs. The U.S. influence exerted by these programs is not after departure of
goods from the United States under some national security or foreign policy justification, but
rather is prior to arrival of the goods at the U.S. border. For example, parties wishing to import
into the United States (or to be involved in the U.S.-bound supply chain) necessarily will know
that C-TPAT participation, while not strictly mandatory, is strongly preferred and in fact all but
necessary in order to avoid being placed at a competitive disadvantage vis á vis other participants
in the import supply chain. In other words, these parties will have the opportunity to agree
through their actions to be bound by the rules of this and other U.S. cargo security programs, or
144
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to decline to be bound and experience import delays or loss of business. This may not be a
choice between equally attractive options, but it is, strictly speaking, a choice. Provided that
participation rules are applied objectively and non-discriminatorily, these programs should be
able to withstand any claims that they are restrictive trade barriers in violation of WTO rules.145

Similarly, the justification of implicit consent nicely sidesteps the question of whether a
lack of reciprocity or bilateral (or multilateral) support for CSI and related programs undermines
the validity of these programs. From an implicit consent point of view, these U.S. cargo security
programs can be seen to impose ex ante conditions on importation into the United States. Under
this view, whether these conditions are applied reciprocally or not is largely immaterial. Either
the conditions are acceptable, in which case they are complied with by foreign states and parties,
or they are not, and importation into the United States is declined or subjected to more restrictive
clearance standards.

Thus, foreign parties and countries doing business with the United States or with a supply
chain that supplies the United States have an opportunity, at least in principle, to agree—
explicitly or by acquiescence—to abide by U.S. cargo security programs prior to completing the
importation transaction in question. Parties are not forced to participate in U.S.-bound supply
chains, and so in that sense a consensual choice remains—although in practice participation may
be compelled to an extent, given the economic clout and purchasing power of the United States.
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One perhaps could object to the implicit consent justification by noting that a particular
supply chain may supply multiple customers in various countries, and that some of these
countries do not require supply chain security measures similar to those required by the United
States. A supplier therefore might be forced to adopt additional and possibly costly security
measures for all shipments to all destinations, in order to satisfy U.S. requirements for the
portion of the shipments bound for the United States. Yet the fact remains that a participant in a
supply chain serving the United States knows this fact ex ante, and has the ability to decide
whether to consent to U.S. jurisdiction or control in advance of participation. The United States
is setting the conditions for entry, and parties can choose to accept or reject these unilateral
terms. The opportunity cost of not participating may be greater as a result of additional lost
business in other locations, but the decision remains ex ante in nature. On the other hand, one
might ask whether, given the United States’ significant economic dependence on imports, a
refusal by significant suppliers to ship goods to the United States due to excessive supply chain
security requirements might lead to U.S. modification of these restrictions.

Implicit acceptance of the U.S. cargo security programs discussed in this article thus
appears to be a viable legal justification for these programs and their forward deployment of U.S.
jurisdiction and potential interference with the domestic sovereignty of U.S. foreign trading
partners. Regardless of whether these cargo security agreements truly enjoy multilateral support
or whether any agreements under these programs are bilateral in form or in substance, the fact
remains that nations and parties wishing to import into the United States do have an ex ante
choice between either complying with the requirements of these U.S. cargo security programs or
foregoing importation to the United States. Again, this assumes that these programs are not
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intended to act as trade barriers. The continuation of imports into the United States by these
parties and states, despite the existence of this choice, can be viewed as implicit, prior consent to
be bound by the requirements of these U.S. cargo security programs.

VI.

Short- and Long-Term Effects of “Pushing the Border Outward”
So far, this article has described U.S. cargo security programs framed as efforts to “push

the border outward,” used twentieth century political geography writings as a conceptual
framework for these programs, and discussed possible legal justifications for these U.S. cargo
security initiatives. In addition, it is important to consider how these current (and possible
future) cargo security programs are likely to alter the international trade landscape. While such
an exercise is by definition speculative, the implications of these cargo security programs are
enormous and far-reaching, and the changes at which they hint suggest the possible direction of
future U.S. and global cargo security and trade policy.

A. Short-Term Effects
A significant short-term effect of current U.S. efforts to “push the border outward” for
cargo security purposes is the extension of U.S. influence and jurisdiction over certain foreign
port operations and overseas supply chain activities. In the near future this extension likely will
remain largely unilateral, regardless of whether the programs involved are styled as multilateral,
bilateral, or unilateral. Specifically, through CSI—which was originally structured as a bilateral
program and has taken on multilateral characteristics since its inception—the United States has
placed customs personnel abroad, but to date few nations have reciprocally stationed their
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customs personnel in the United States.146 Similarly, C-TPAT has extended U.S. influence over
foreign supply chains inbound to the United States, but to date there has been little overt foreign
influence over U.S. outbound supply chain security.147 In like fashion, U.S. programs such as
FAST, the 24 Hour Rule, and the other advance notification programs discussed above
unilaterally mandate changes to foreign supply chain activities, with no corresponding changes
to U.S. outbound security measures.148

Thus, as discussed previously, the United States’ current efforts to forward deploy
inbound cargo security border functions is, in effect, an atavistic disaggregation of U.S. border
functions. In terms of cargo security functions U.S. borders have reverted from being “sharply
defined lines, fixed by nations like fences between their respective properties” to being more
akin to frontiers.149 This approach is entirely consistent with the defensive rhetoric of these
programs and their focus on U.S. national security.

It is also important to bear in mind that the U.S. cargo security programs discussed in this
article represent U.S. efforts to exert increased influence or control over activities previously not
heavily regulated by the United States. These cargo security programs have resulted in both
forward deployment of U.S. border functions and the assertion of additional U.S. jurisdiction
over inbound cargo activities. This observation is consistent with the view of governments as
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entities that expand their power and control into new areas over which they previously had little
or no influence. Such new spheres can be physical ones, such as colonies or new territories; new
industries; new spheres of commerce or communication (such as the internet); or new areas of
social concern (such as the rise of federal environmental protection efforts in the 1960s and
1970s). As new spheres of economic activity or concern emerge over time, governments may
seek to extend their influence over those spheres when such control is deemed in the national
interest.150 In the case of cargo security, little advantage was seen in an expansion of U.S.
governmental control over these activities until after the September 11, 2001, attacks; after that
date, the U.S. government energetically sought to exert greater control in this area.

As a result, at least in the short term the United States has rectified what might be
perceived as a jurisdictional imbalance between inbound and outbound commercial activity: the
United States’ assertion of greater control over inbound cargo security matters now more closely
matches its longstanding extraterritorial claims of control and jurisdiction over outbound
cargo.151

B. Long-Term Effects
The short-term effect of current U.S. efforts to “push the border outward” is certainly
interesting. Even more striking, however, are the potential long-term effects of these programs
on the pattern and conduct of international trade in goods. If multilateral support for these
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programs falters, then the long-term prognosis may well look like an extension of the short-term,
unilateral nature of these programs. If multilateral support for and participation in CSI, C-TPAT
and related cargo security programs continues, however, the long-term effects promise to be
quite different.

1.

Increased Harmonization of Global Cargo Security Measures and Reduced Cargo
Security Transactions Costs

First, if multilateral support and participation continues, this trend could be seen as the
first surge in a new wave of international harmonization in cargo security.

Similar to

commercial efforts beginning in the 1950s to physically harmonize international cargo shipments
through containerization, the adoption of common standards for cargo security would increase
inter-jurisdictional transparency for cargo security requirements and reduce transactions costs
pertaining to cargo security. This would occur because participating countries would adopt
consistent (and possibly identical) cargo security requirements for shipments.

The set of

applicable cargo security standards among participating countries thus would be reduced from
multiple sets of non-harmonized rules to a single, generally harmonized set of rules. This would
reduce both the cost of gathering information regarding transactions (the information concerning
applicable cargo security measures) as well as the cost of complying with these measures
(through a single set of cargo security procedures for multiple countries).

In other words, the cost of complying with national cargo security rules can be seen as
both a barrier to entry and a fixed cost. A country’s inbound cargo security rules act as barriers
to entry if they prevent parties from engaging in cargo trade with that country. To the extent a

Thinking Outside the Border
Page 60
party does engage in cargo trade with that country, however, the cost of compliance is largely a
fixed cost, since the same level of knowledge and compliance is required regardless of the
number of shipments undertaken. Harmonizing various countries’ cargo security rules would not
reduce the initial informational cost of complying with a single country’s cargo security rules,
but it would reduce (or even largely eliminate) the cumulative cost of complying with the
harmonized cargo security rules of additional countries employing similar rules. In that manner,
harmonized cargo security rules would be less of a barrier to entry. By the same token, a party
that seeks to expand its cargo trading activities from one participating country to another would
experience little in the way of additional fixed costs related to cargo security compliance.152 The
benefits of such transparency and reduced costs in fact are quite similar to the benefits of
harmonization and increased transparency in U.S. state commercial laws brought about through
the incorporation of the Uniform Commercial Code into U.S state legal codes, which has helped
facilitate the growth in U.S. interstate commerce in recent decades.153

Such multilateralization of cargo security measures also would follow in the footsteps of
previous efforts to harmonize U.S. international trade laws with those of its major trading
partners. For example, the 1979 Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
produced the Customs Valuation Code, which took a substantially different approach to the
valuation of imported merchandise than the traditional U.S. method of customs valuation. The
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United States and its WTO trading partners have implemented the Customs Valuation Code into
their national laws, so that while interpretation and application of its provisions certainly can
vary from country to country, there is at least a common textual basis for customs valuation
among these trading partners.154 Similarly, in 1988 the United States abandoned its traditional
customs classification scheme, the Tariff Schedule of the United States (“TSUS”), in favor of the
Harmonized Commodity, Description and Coding System developed by the Brussels-based
Customs Cooperation Council and already in use by most U.S. trading partners.155 Similar
harmonization has occurred with respect to the U.S. export classification scheme (internationally
harmonized scheme adopted in 1995),156 as well as antidumping and countervailing duty laws,
which are to an extent internationally harmonized through WTO auspices.157 In addition, the
United States and many of its trading partners have reached agreements on a consensual basis on
related matters such as proliferation control measures to be implemented voluntary into
participating nation’s domestic laws.158 Such voluntary harmonization can be expected to reduce
some of the transactions costs of complying with international trade laws, as companies engaged
in transborder transactions will be more able to adopt regional or even global procedures for
cargo trade, instead of crafting unique procedures or policies for separate countries.
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2.

Multilateral Disaggregation of Border Functionality for Cargo Security Purposes

If multilateralization of cargo security proves to be meaningful and not in terms of form
only, the long-term effect of programs such as CSI and C-TPAT could be to establish an
overlapping network of thematically similar and generally harmonized cargo security controls
and standards among the world’s most significant trading partners. The resulting multilateral
disaggregation of cargo security border functions could be nothing short of revolutionary for the
conduct of international trade. Actual physical or legal borders would not change as a result of
such multilateralization (and indeed they have not in the current unilateral disaggregation of
border functions by the United States), but multilateral disaggregation could permanently alter
the functionality of national borders from a cargo security perspective. That is, the locations
where a country’s cargo security functions would be performed for inbound and outbound cargo
traffic would become far less precisely mirrored by the location of the country’s actual borders.
A number of each country’s inbound cargo security functions could be carried out abroad by its
officials located in foreign countries. Similarly, a country’s outbound cargo functions could be
performed prior to export by foreign government personnel located within the country, and
possibly in conjunction with local country personnel, as under CSI’s current structure.

In other words, cargo security measures traditionally associated with the border would be
spread across a spectrum spanning the country of export and the country of import. As state
functions become less tied to state borders—with U.S. customs agents stationed abroad and a
“global” U.S. tax base—one could question whether actual, physical borders would become less
important in certain respects, at least regarding the functioning of international business and
trade in goods. This conclusion would be fully consistent with the debate over “virtual states”
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versus the traditional structure and roles of the nation-state.159

3.

Fewer Distinctions Between Domestic and International Transactions in Goods

Such a blurring or graying of the border—making borders function for cargo security
purposes as overlapping frontiers or buffer zones—would erase many current distinctions
between international and domestic transactions in goods. In a truly multilateral cargo security
environment, a program such as CSI would affect not just shipments to the United States, but
also shipments from the United States to elsewhere—and in fact would have significant potential
to affect foreign port operations generally. In addition, programs such as C-TPAT would have
an effect not just on internationally-bound shipments, but also on in-country transactions, as
procedures and standards become adopted consistently across supply chain operations. In other
words, international transactions would become less distinguishable from domestic ones, at least
in terms of legal obligations and cargo security procedures.

Thus, as harmonization of international cargo security measures would work to lower
transactions costs for international cargo shipments, the new application of these same cargo
security requirements to domestic transactions could make domestic cargo shipments more
complex, and thus potentially more costly. That is, it can be posited that in many countries,
domestic cargo shipments from one internal point to another are currently subjected to fewer
cargo security requirements than international cargo, simply because these internal shipments are
considered safer. This is the case in the United States: CSI, C-TPAT, and the other programs
discussed in this article are aimed not at domestic shipments, but rather at inbound shipments
159
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from abroad.

If international cargo security measures were to influence or apply to wholly domestic
shipments, however, this would change. It would be, in short, a raising of the transactions-cost
bar in domestic transactions. The overall impact, then, would be a simultaneous lowering of
transactions costs in international cargo shipments (due to harmonization) and a raising of
transactions costs in domestic shipments (due to new requirements). In the short term this could
have negative domestic impact, but in the longer term it could well mean that domestic and
international transactions in goods would converge more than ever in terms of their requirements
and procedures. Moreover, as more and more “domestic” companies have to (or choose to)
comply with these international cargo security programs in order to remain competitive in their
domestic markets, this might mean they would be more prepared for the entry into international
trade, if they so choose. International trade transactions generally are seen as more expensive
and complicated than domestic business transactions, with the differences being both in degree
and in kind—yet if domestic companies engaged in cargo transport were already versed in and
compliant with many of the requirements for international shipments, the differences in degree
and in kind pertaining to cargo security largely would disappear.

In this fashion, a traditional barrier to international trade might be eliminated, or at least
significantly reduced. Its reduction or elimination, however, would not come about by lessening
its prevalence, but rather by having it added to the domestic commercial landscape of the United
States and other countries. Companies that wish to continue doing business in goods would
adopt and adapt to these cargo security requirements. This likely would entail some additional
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cost, as already noted, but those domestic concerns that did adjust to and use these new cargo
security measures would be rendered more ready to engage in international commerce in goods.

To draw an analogy, one might view borders as walls that act to hinder international
transactions. Inside the walls the terrain is lower, so that only those companies or individuals
with enough experience, resources, or sophistication can climb the wall and engage in
international trade. If the ground inside the wall is filled in, however, the formerly high wall
becomes more akin to a knee wall. At the risk of turning analogy into pun, those inside the wall
who do not adjust to the new terrain get buried, while those who do adjust can step across the
wall with far less effort. This perhaps is the larger view of modern international trade in goods,
with smaller entities and even individuals increasingly able to compete in the global marketplace
with large multinational enterprises. Typically, however, the story is one of improvements in
technology or simplifications to governmental regulations flattening the competitive field or
reducing transactions cost barriers to entry.160 In the case of cargo security, however, domestic
actors could be faced with additional regulatory requirements for cargo security—and yet
paradoxically, the long-term effect of multilateralization of cargo security measures might be to
promote international trade, irrespective of the additional transactions costs that these measures
160

See supra text accompanying notes 155-159 (regarding harmonization of customs laws); see also Anne Hubbard,
Initiatives Promote Paperless Environment, U.S. CUSTOMS TODAY (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2002/January/custoday_ia.xml; Governance, Finance and Trade Division,
East and Central Asia Development Bank, Working Paper No. 1: Harmonization and Simplification of Customs
Documentation and Procedures (Oct. 2003) (noting already-existent harmonization of customs procedures and
documentation among Asian nations and EU member states), available at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2003/CCC/Second_Mtg/wp_01.pdf; Sub-Committee on Customs
Procedures, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Toward One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the
Change (Nov. 2005) (discussing simplification and harmonization of APEC member customs procedures), available
at http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/committees/committee_on_trade/sub-committee_on_customs.html. In
addition, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2005) (discussing technological advances allowing smaller entities to participate in international business
activities).

Thinking Outside the Border
Page 66
entail.

VII.

Conclusion
This article has addressed questions about the scope and nature of U.S. inbound cargo

security measures following September 11, 2001. The events underlying these cargo security
measures read like a series of unanticipated consequences. First, the advent of containerized
shipping and GATT-induced trade liberalization helped fuel exponential growth in international
trade following World War II. Then, combined with the rise of just-in-time inventory systems,
these developments led to an unambiguous (although tacit) U.S. preference for trade efficiency
over trade security, as global economic interdependence increased. The United States was, in a
sense, a victim of its own success.
The weaknesses of this system became a matter of significant concern and debate
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the United States established programs to
“push the border outward” as a means to simultaneously maintain trade flows and improve cargo
security. These forward deployment measures have effectively led to expanded U.S. regulation
of inbound cargo activities, an area over which the United States previously had exercised little
extraterritorial control or jurisdiction. These forward deployment measures, however, have
raised concerns over infringement on the sovereignty and jurisdiction of U.S. trading partners.
The United States thus has found itself at something of an odd impasse—namely, facing a
jurisdictional issue caused by the very internationalization the United States had sought to create.
Fortunately, the United States thus far has been able to obtain substantial official
multilateral support for its inbound cargo security programs, and this has lent support to the
programs’ legitimacy. As discussed, however, it is possible that multilateral support for these
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programs could falter. In the absence of multilateral support, the strongest justification for these
programs is that of implied consent to these programs by U.S. trading partners—a justification
that works even on a unilateral basis. Given the modern American penchant for unilateralism, it
is worth having such a unilateral legal justification for these programs in hand.
In contrast, if these U.S. cargo security programs retain their current multilateral support,
they could lead to the establishment of an overlapping network of harmonized national cargo
security programs that disaggregate border functions relating to cargo and effectively apply to
both international and domestic cargo shipments. The result in that case could be a convergence
of domestic and international cargo security practices and requirements, which would help
further reduce the domestic-versus-foreign distinction in an already increasingly interdependent
and international trade-driven world. If that occurs, it would be one more step toward increasing
the de facto economic integration and interdependency of the world’s major trading partners, at a
time when their will to cooperatively address joint political problems sometimes seems less than
clear. Perhaps, then, the best approach would be to maintain some semblance of multilateral
support for these cargo security programs, and let the resulting integration and harmonization
make its positive mark on the patterns of global trade.

